[204] Nietzsche wishes to protest an improper elevation of scientific thought in its relation to philosophy. He advocates that the individuals experience uniquely qualifies him to speak. The alternative is to risk speaking about something he is not qualified to mention. It has become apparent, that within the context of a herd that desires freedom from all masters, the emancipation of science from philosophy has exagerated the self glorifying and conceitedness of the schollar to the point at which he seeks dominion over philosophy.
Behind the contempt for philosophy Nietzsche discovered the scarred battlegrounds of one philosophers attempt after another to rid the world of the other —the result being a general ill-will to all philosophy. Schopenhauers rage against Hegel, being a prime example as he succeeded in severing an entire generation of Germans from its connection with German culture. Nietzsche asserts it may have been humanness, all-too-humanness that injured the reverence for philosophy and opened the doors to the instinct of the populace.
Let it be acknowledged at this point then how the modern world diverges from that of the ancient world. That the positivist or realists seek to instill a profound distrust and disbelief in the great venture of philosophy. In Nietzsches opinion there is some merit in relation to this reinvention of philosophy as subbordinate. Namely that philosophy as reduced to a "theory of knowledge" which is nothing more than the profession of an era, never proceeds beyond the threshold. Such a philosophy denies itself the right to enter the modern era. How could such a philosophy rule?
[205] Nietzsche observes that many dangers face the philosopher that seeks to evolve to attain their elevation. The structure of science has grown enormously and the allure of intellectual refinement presents a risk he will tire of his venture and attach himself as a "specialist" The risk of such a fall is that one no longer leads unless he is an actor, a misleader.
Yet other challenges are present. This includes the decision to say yes or not to life and its worth despite the most extensive hesitation, doubt and bemusement. It is common to be consider "philosophical" if one lives prudently or distinctly. Wisdom then to the herd seems to be a withdrawal successfully from a bad game. Yet Nietzsche suggests distinct from the schollar and scientist the genuine philosopher lives imprudently and unwisely; he risks himself as he plays the bad game.
[206] Nietzsche asserts that which gives rise to both the schollar and the scientist has something of religion about it. He explains that both are neither self-ruling nor self-sufficient. The scientist is industrious and has an instinct for what those about him need. Yet there exists with in the scientist the perpetual need to verify his usefulness and value because of his inward distrust that requires overcoming time and time again. The schollar conversely is full of petty envy and is adept in highlighting criticisms in what heights he cannot attain. He is confident until one greater arrives forcing him into cold submission. The schollars most dangerous fault is the desire for mediocrity. To Labour destructive against the greater man and indulgently relax.
[207] Nietzsche agrees that whilst we may be thankful for objectivity the de-personalising of the spirit has become a celebrated accomplishment like it was always the end game. Realistically the ideal scientist is a costly tool; a mirror with no purpose other than to reflect the forms of other things. His confusion extends to his own needs and tomorrow he has no greater understanding of himself than he did today. He doesn't take himself seriously or devote time to himself and is indifferent to the question of life and its value. He is the worthless remains of his virtue, his Love and hatred are mediocre and inauthentic. He is only genuine in as far as he can be objective. He has no capacity to afirm or deny and is too distant from the world to decide upon good or evil. He is no leader; he is nothing more than a costly measuring instrument. A lump of clay waiting for a form to pass by in whose image he shapes himself. A frame less man and nothing for a woman.
[208] To consider oneself to not be a sceptic is to face mistrust and numerous questions. Indeed among those that are timid, a non-sceptic, such ideas are considered dangerous like a new kind of explosive weapon; one that not only denies but one that means and practices denial. For there is no greater sedative than scepticism. The sceptic is far to easily frightened into beginning by saying no to the question of life and its worth and only contributing a yes when there is the most clear agreement. He perhaps echos Socrates with his assertion that "he knows he knows nothing". Yet Nietzsche enquires is there not time to consider things in turn? Does everything have to become clear at once before one can commit himself? Scepticism is often the outworking of nervousness and those who inherit it from the radical blending of classes are lacking in spirit and most notably will. They are unable to make independent decisions or enjoy the pleasure of willing. Paralysis of the will is rife and often dresses as the "scientific spirit" or "objectiveness". Will awaits in the wings in Russia, waiting to discharge itself uncertain whether to be affirmative or not. For Europe to contend it must unite as a single will and become equally threatening. The time for petty politics is past the next stage is the struggle for dominion over the world; the will to truly great politics.
[209] Nietzsche explains that perhaps another kind of scepticism is necessary for this age. He uses the story of the father of Frederick the great who identified that there was something lacking in man. His Son had lapsed into atheism and he saw the great leech scepticism and suspected his son no longer had the hardness of heart for good or evil or the strength to command. Yet unbeknownst to Fredericks Father there grew in Frederick that new kind of scepticism, one of daring. One that refutes and takes possession giving the spirit a dangerous liberty whilst fiercely guarding the heart. The emergence of this uniquely German spirit established itself as a fearless gaze and a resolve to dangerous voyages of discovery; one that brings a shudder to the most temperate humanitarian.
[210] Nietzsche enquires then if philosophers of the future should bear resemblance to sceptics of this kind. They might rightly call themselves critics. They will dare to go further to acquire knowledge and experiment. They will be less inclined to that which distinguishes the critic from the sceptic namely a preoccupation with certainty of worth and the application of a uniform method. The capacity to stand alone and be responsible for it. A delight in the dissection of ideas and a stomach to match. With no ambition to please or desire for truth. They would not seek to reconcile but instead abhor that which is not born from that critical scepticism from which he is begat. This critical discipline in interlectual thought will be a precious adornment. Yet they will not want to be called critics, given the thought that philosophy is criticism and nothing else is not palatable. They will be clear that critics are instruments of the philosopher and not philosophers themselves.
[211] Nietzsche rejects the notion that scientists are philosophers and philosophers scientists with credit given where none is due and missed when it is owed. It may be necessary that the philosopher come from such a place as the scientist, schollar, theologian and historian that he might traverse the vast range of valuations. His task however is not merely to see values but to create them. Philosophical workers seek to fix former determinations of value that arise from the logical, political and artistic contexts. True philosophers however are law givers and say "thus it shall be" outlining the "what" and the "why" grasping at the future with a creative hand. Knowledge for them is creating [law-giving] and their will to truth is will to power.
[212] Nietzsche asserts that the philosopher, one indispensable to his age, finds himself living contrary to the era in which he lives. He has found himself task with putting a knife to the heart of the values of his age for the sake of a new greatness in man. He is tasked to move the herd on from ideas that were outlived to face the world of "modern ideas" moving himself to become the extent to which man can stretch his responsibilities. Nowadays the virtue of the age weakens and compensates for the will; strength of will must therefore be included within the category of greatness. The opposite being humility, renunciation and selflessness; letting oneself go for the sake of happiness. He who is master of his own virtues will be the greatest and is such greatness possible nowadays?
[213] Nietzsche asserts the challenge of knowing what a philosopher is given it is something to be lived not something to know. Nietzsche asserts that one should have the pride not to know it given it cannot be taught. There is a tendency to speak about what one knows nothing about and for such individuals anything that requires effort is reserved for the noble whilst they receded into entertainment. To "think" and to take a matter "seriously" is considered one and the same act [there is a failure to sincerely engage]. Artists have a finer intuition one that distinguishes between the arbitrary and the necessary. What use is it then for every day intellects to consider such a problem? These dangerous paths are not for one's such as these. True philosophers must be bred for it; many philosophers preparing the way for him in creating, transmitting and embodying virtues. That he might take up his great responsibility characterised by separation from the herd and defense of what is misunderstood be it God or Devil. This is the art of commanding which rarely looks up, admires or loves.
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