Within this Chapter Nietzsche addresses attempts to reflect upon the origin and nature of morality. He firstly criticises the lack of critical reflection upon the possibility that morality is not a definite thing. That moral decisions are time and decision specific; morality as the flora of context [time and decision specific]. He notes that morality can profess much about the proponent. Specifically the proponents willingness to obey and his belief in the necessity for others to do likewise. Following this line of reasoning Nietzsche concludes that every system of Morals then is a tyranny. The belief that "Thou must obey some one, and for a long time; OTHERWISE thou wilt come to grief, and lose all respect for thyself".
Nietzsche suggests that ultimately the reasons for moral obedience are illusive and that it is unlikely we will truly understand what motivates compliance in humans. We simply observe a large number of people who obey a small number of people that command. Yet to lead means to step outside the moral order of things. It weakens man to make peace with the existence of warring values. Should this conflict instead become a renewed source of life then he has potential to become one that conquers.
Nietzsche offers several critiques of utilitarianism indicating that such an ideal is built upon the faulty premise that we (a) decide what is good, and (b) interpret our behaviour to fit our conception of the good. Yet Nietzsche criticises such thinking as nothing more than suggestions of behaviour modification to avoid self inflicted danger [do X to maximise happiness as though utility was the end most desirable]. In his opinion such suggestions have no greater value than homeopathic recipes or old wives tales. Human behaviour is far too nuanced for such generalisations. The implication that only stupid people do wrong [if they only knew what would make them happy and that in suffering I might gain nothing] and that doing wrong is not desirable.
As long as the moral litmus is group utility Nietzsche concludes there can be no good actions by the individual. An action such as charity can no longer be considered good independently, given the measure is the outcome for the herd not the receiver of charity. How much or how little danger to the community is contained within an opinion or action becomes the new moral standard. To stand alone even with good reason is to threaten the herd. Aspirations of mediocrity then attain the highest honour given they threaten the herd the least. Yet impotent and mediocre man is not the end game. Such a moral ideal is built upon the utopic vision that if we could do away with danger morality would not be necessary.
Nietzsche asserts that man has proven himself to be a herd animal. Precisely what is good and what is evil is nothing more than the instinct of the herd that prevails. An autonomous herd, proposed by socialists, does away with any kind of master slave distinction. The natural conclusion of which is the removal of rights; further still the opposition of rights given such rights are no longer necessary. Where then can man find hope for the species? Nietzsche indicates that what is necessary are original minds strong enough to initiate opposite estimates of value. To teach man the future of humanity as his will, his desire. To train and educate to avoid the foolish repetition of chance that has so far prevailed. Such leaders are necessary and the stark reality is they may never arrive. He who knows the herd and those [socialists] that seek to place the great alongside the weak -and make nothing more of man than a gregarious animal- knows such a frightening reality is possible; and perhaps may be motivated to act to prevent such a calamity.
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