Beyond Good and Evil :: Illuminating the Religious Mood

The third chapter entitled "the religious mood" is one within which Nietzsche offers a fierce attack on the ideology that accompanys religious thought. It focuses on what Nietzsche perceives are the aims of the religious spirit, and the dangers found therein. Nietzsche begins with a description of the religious pathology which he terms the "slow suicide of reason" of its adherents. Arguing that it could be nothing other than self-mutilation to disregard and even negate the fundamental instincts that keep man alive.

In its Infancy religion was concerned with the sacrifice of others [primative stage]. Next it became concerned with the sacrifice of instinct for virtue [moral stage]. Finally it sought to sacrifice its God that it might worship gravity, magnetism and nothingness [modern stage]. This final folly Nietzsche asserts is a wound man still carry the scars of today.

How then is religion alluring? Why then would individuals be taken in by it if it is harmful? Nietzsche suggest this is for three reasons. Firstly man perceives within the Saint a strength of will that mirrors his own [albeit one that is secretly a negation of the will] this causes him to pause and make enquiries. Secondly a life of piety prevents the discovery of truth; man fears nothing more than the discovery of truth before he is strong enough to hear it. Thirdly religion is an effective means by which to find satisfaction in a world within which it is difficult to live.

Nietzsche alludes to religion being a tool of statecraft in much the same way as economics or politics. It is a tool with which to bind the public conscience to oneself, bring about peace, and also to excuse the ugliness of politics. Yet he warns against religion being permitted to become an end in itself. The crux of his objection appears within [62] where he describes man as an animal not yet adjusted to his environment. He asserts that man is weakened by religions grasp on the public conscience. Religion Nietzsche explains seeks to undermine the potential of the species. It does so by preserving what should have perished for the sake of the suffering populous. The "new creation" for Nietzsche is the "sublime abortion" of man and his glorious potential. Nothing more than a pathetic shadow of all that he might otherwise have become.

This chapter also introduces two  interesting concepts of note that feature elsewhere within Nietzsche thought. Namely the idea of the eternal child and "Circulus vitiosus deus". With regard to the former Nietzsche proposes that perhaps what the intellect has exercised itself upon has only been the opportunity for its exercise. A childish game constructed by a childish mind. Nothing more than a child's plaything and pain to an old man. Yet perhaps this old man requires a new plaything or pain in the future. This cycle is the eternal child.

"Circulus vitiosus deus" translated as "the figure of the vicious circle". Is the anonymous free spirit. This figure, having abolished the meaning of actions in his abandonment of delusional morality, demands infinite repetition of events. When confronted with this nameless man one must either reject his actions as absurd, or accept they are unable to offer criteria from which to judge the abhorrent. Either way this figure makes his point and exposes the possibilities and impossibilities of the individuals chosen moral prejudice.

Beyond Good and Evil :: The Religious Mood

[45] With regards to the problem of knowledge Nietzsche warns of the danger in sending scholars to do the work of the individual. This mass of painful experience is for the adept to arrange. Nietzsche asserts this is something which one must approach oneself. The individual cannot rely on others to make such discoveries on one's behalf. As such he advocates for curiosity noting those that choose a defense of a truth receive nothing.

[46] Nietzsche proposes that Christianity today represents not a firm foundation but the slow suicide of reason. Faith is the sacrifice of freedom and pride at the expense of subjection (being subject to the control of another). He likens it to a form of self mutilation or slavery given it is a painful experience. It disregards the context and chronology that drives a free spirit. For this reason Nietzsche asserts modern man has moved beyond the terrible possibility of the God on the cross. As a slave revolts against nobles so his many sufferings in subsections caused him to revolt against noble morality.

[47] Nietzsche pathologies the religious mood with its prescriptions of solitude, fasting and sexual abstinence. Noting that sudden outbursts of sensualism and renunciation of the will is common both to the savage and civilised. Yet the religious mood is unique in its proliferation of absurdities and superstitions. So how is this negation of the will possible? Even in the most recent philosophy is the question mark of the religious crisis. What remains interesting in the religious mood is the appearance of a miracle; the succession of opposite conditions of the soul valued in morally opposed ways. People thought they could get a grip on the idea that the "bad man" became the "Saint". Yet didn't this happen because people believed in opposite moral evaluations and saw, allowed, and interpreted these opposites into the text and the facts? Perhaps the real miracle then is the failure of interpretation.

[48] Nietzsche suggests that unbelief has distinct meanings for Catholic and protestant countries. For the former it was a rebellion against the spirit of the race and the latter a return to such a spirit.

[49] Nietzsche explains his astonishment at the religiosity if the Greeks; noting it is a noble kind if man who stands before life in such a way. Later Nietzsche notes that as the rabble gained prominence fear grew over religion sowing the seeds of Christianity.

[50] Nietzsche notes that with regards to passion for God there are the mean spirited, honest hearted, and persistently irritating. Protestantism tends to fall in with the latter. He notes that there is an flavour of interlectual exultation and feminine tenderness that longs for the unity of the mystical and physical.

[51] Nietzsche asserts that mightiest men honour the Saint as they recognise the true strength of will; By honouring him, they honour something in themselves. Yet Nietzsche notes the saint also arouses suspicion given the unnatural self negation; as such the will to power is what causes man to stop and question him.

[52] Nietzsche asserts the Jewish old testament contains sayings and men like no other. He compares the western "Modern man" to a house trained animal. The taste for the old testament is a standard against which we judge the great and small. Nietzsche suggests that perhaps for some the new testament will appeal (with its odour of genuine, tender, petty spirit). Nietzsche suggests the greatest "sin in the spirit" is the binding of these books together.

[53] Nietzsche offers explanation for the decline of theism and rise of atheism. He notes that God does not hear and even if he did he would not know how to help. Nietzsche highlights that he seems incapable of communicating himself clearly. As such although the religious instinct grows vigorously, Nietzsche explains it rejects theism with profound distrust.

[54] Nietzsche explains that all modern philosophy has made an attack upon the concept of soul under the guise of the subject predicate distinction. Whilst it is anti-christian it is by no means anti-religious. One once believed in the soul as one believed in grammar; "I" is the condition "think" the predicate supposing a subject as cause. To resolve this "think" became the condition and "I" that synthesis made possible by thinking itself. Kant wished to prove that starting from the subject, the subject could not be proved nor the object (apparent existence of the subject). Therefore the soul may not have always been strange to kant.

[55] Nietzsche suggests a hierarchy of religious cruelty. This begins with the sacrifice of others beloved by the people this was the primitive period. Next they were required to sacrifice their stronger instincts their "nature" during the moral period. Finally when all had been sacrificed man sacrificed virtue and his god to worship gravity, magnetism and nothingness. Nietzsche asserts that the paradox of sacrificing God for nothingness was a profound wound man knows only too well.

[56] He who places himself beyond good and evil sees perhaps the other ideal: the ideal of the man full of life and exuberance. Who has learned to compromise and has things in order with what was and is. And enterally wishes to experience it again as it was and is recurrently.

[57] The world becomes more sharply focused; seems larger and more profound as mans insight into this world increases. New enigmas and new elements present themselves as a challenge to his intellect. Yet perhaps that which the intellect has exercised itself upon has only been the opportunity for its exercise. A childish game constructed by a childish mind. Perhaps that which has caused greatest suffering such as "God" and "sin" will seem to us nothing more than a child's plaything and pain to an old man. Yet perhaps this old man requires a new plaything or pain in the future. This is man as eternal child.

[58] Nietzsche suggests that inaction with a clean conscience is a feature of religion; that aristocratic sentiment that work is dishonouring to the body. Yet among these individuals are "free thinkers" that participate in religion where necessary out of duty to family or country but are indifferent: there is no time for religion it is a question of new business or pleasure. Then there are the pious that glean all they can from history without taking a step toward what might constitute piety. They avoid religious individuals and the trouble this brings. Childlike naivety is necessary for the scholar and his belief in his superiority over the religious; beyond before and above which he believes he has developed.

[59] Nietzsche asserts Anyone who has studied the world in depth will have realised men are superficial. It is the instinct to preserve oneself which teaches him to be false. Here and there one finds "pure forms" in the artist and philosopher. That only seek enjoyment in life by falsifying it (has it so disgusted them?) by its image being clarified, refined and deified. The Religious persons are the highest among their rank. Nietzsche suggests that man fears the discovery of truth before he is strong enough to hear it and the "life in God" is its pinicle; the artistic fear of incurable pessimism that causes entire culture to cleave to religion. Perhaps there is no more effective a means of making man beautiful than piety, given that by it he becomes so superficial, so good his appearance no longer offends.

[60] Nietzsche indicates that to love man for the sake of God is a noble misadventure.

[61] Nietzsche asserts the Philosopher employs religion as a means to discipline and educate in much the same way as he employs the political and economic context. Its influence varies according to those placed under its spell and protection. For the strong it is another means by which to overcome authority- a bond between subjects and rulers. With the former surrendering conscience to the latter. Religion is also a means by which the rulers obtain peace and immunity from the uglyness of politics. Through religion some subject ascend to rule by means of marital customs. It offers aspiration and the choicest interlectual tidbits such as solice and silence. Asceticism and puritanism are the means subjects achieve ascendancy. For the rest born to serve and in the service of general utility there is contentedness; there own aspects become endurable to them. Religion is an effective means by which to find satisfaction in a world within which it is difficult to live.

[62] Nietzsche asserts that religion should be utilised like politics and economics as tools of statecraft. When religion becomes an end in itself there is significant danger. Success in man is typically the exception rather than the rule given man is not yet properly adapted to his environment. The higher a type he represent the greater chance of failure; the law of irrationality manifest in man. Yet how can religion respond to a surpluss of failures? It responds by seeking to preserve whatever can be kept alive for the sake of the suffering population. By so doing it preserves that which should have perished, that which weakens man. Once this systemic preservation of the sick and suffering has taken place what next? It offers a revision of values in a self-destructive fashion; reframing higher man as an unconscionable monster. This was the mission of the church to lead man to suspect every autonomous instinct that might otherwise lead him to greatness. Its goal the sublime abortion of man. Such men are not worthy enough nor strong enough to be the artist of man and sculpt him accordingly. Such individuals have produced the laudible and gregarious dwarfen species we see today.

Beyond Good and Evil :: Illuminating the Free Spirit

Nietzsche asserts that mankind has gone to great lengths to avoid thoughtfulness. Knowledge funnelled through our deterministic dialectic offers a comfortable imagined world of definite absolutes, where in actual fact there are really only degree's and gradation. Many are quick to suffer for, and rush to the defense of, such ideals as though truth needed zealous defenders from falsity. Some individuals withdraw that they might dot every "i" and cross every "t" without risk of challenge. The higher man instead will embrace disgust from others; he is attentive to harsh and refined cynicism.  Nietzsche asserts that independence from such truth is uncommon and requires daring; such a route is not for the feint hearted given the possibility of loosing one's way. Two distinct groups become apparent the first that constitute the group and the second the select few. These groups operate from different perspectives and communication is difficult between the two. What nourishes one is poison to the other. 

Nietzsche describes different epochs in history in relation to value judgments. At one time the value of an action is inferred from its consequence [pre-moral], in another the intention behind the act [moral]. Nietzsche suggests that a further movement is needed in which the value is inferred by that which is unintentional [ultra-moral]. Perhaps the sensibilities that suggest otherwise simply deceive us? He suggest it is naivete to believes in immediate moral certainties. Why not deception?  Is it not sufficient to suppose degree's of seemingness? 

Nietzsche enquires that If we were to assume the reality of our desires and passions would this not be sufficient to understand the world? These desires and passions assemble in a mighty unity called life. It is reasonable to suggest this is one thing rather than many; life operating as a single "will". Where the effects of this will are seen in the world we can identify it's power extends to the world. It is reasonable then to suggest then that all action is the product of this will; all action can be traced back to will to power. Nietzsche asserts that all active force is will to power and nothing else. 

Nietzsche highlights that happiness and virtue are no argument and unhappiness and wickedness are just as little counter arguments to an action. Nietzsche explains that something might be true but be the greatest danger. In such situations the wicked might be best placed to achieve success. Perhaps then severity and craft are more useful in the development of strong individuals than the refined gentle learned man; the individual must learn to conserve himself. 

Nietzsche predicts the rise of the post-modernists; individuals that cleave to "truth" but not dogmatically. The "good" will become deeply personal given the idea of common good is an oxymoron; what is common is typically of little value. Nietzsche asserts that such philosophers will be something profoundly natural unlike those that desire the opposite. These are the superficial and the cause of all human misery and failure. They seek the security, safety and comfort in life. Their usual song is "equality of rights" and "sympathy with all sufferers". Nietzsche asserts that suffering is something looked upon by them as something to be done away with. 

For Nietzsche Dangerousness must increase for human refinement and spirit to develop. That man's will to life might increase to become will to power. That everything wicked serves as well for the elevation of the human species as it's opposite. "free spirits" find themselves at the other extreme of all modern ideology, silent so they don't betray what a spirit can free itself from and where it may be driven - beyond good and evil. Grateful for distress because it frees them from rule and prejudice, inquisitive to a fault with teeth and stomach for the most indigestible suggestions. Nietzsche concludes this chapter by asserting that such are free spirits, the new philosophers!

Beyond Good and Evil :: The Free Spirit

[24] Nietzsche expresses awe at the means by which mankind has attempted to retain his ignorance in order to enjoy life. This "will to knowledge" or rather "will to ignorance" seeks to make all things around human beings clear and simple that we might avoid thoughtfulness. Knowledge then seeks to keep us in a simplified and imagined world [because the alternative is far less palatable]. Nietzsche notes that in such a state our language then becomes one of opposites whereas in this indifferent world there are only degree's and gradation. 

[25] Nietzsche urges caution in suffering or martyrdom for such "truth". He notes that it spoils the neutrality of conscience and makes us act irrationally. This is no clear exemplified than when the most insidious elements challenge such "truth" that we rush to defend this as though it were, innocent, helpless [a kind of Stockholm syndrome of sorts given truth's own insidious agenda by our own standards]. This results Nietzsche suggests in an obsession with minutiae; to dot every "i" and cross every "t" that accusers might not mistake us for what we are. Solitude helps also given our right to practice good in any sense goes unchallenged. Nietzsche concludes that sacrifice for the sake of "truth" then exposes the insecurities in us that are given a voice in our accuser. 

[26] Nietzsche assert that some individuals upon recognising that they are the exception to the rule [read "truth"] and withdraw. Others drive forward and embrace the ensuing disgust from others relishing such an opportunity. However if this is not something voluntary, and the individual persistently avoids such confrontation he is willing to give ground to such "truth" and commit himself to the study of the "average man". One whom "truth" describes in the history of philosophy. If he is fortunate he might meet those that expose this in him through their own discourse in public. The higher man must then be attentive to all coarse and fine cynicism. Nietzsche asserts that such a possible outcome may befall even the greatest genius. He encourages one who has fallen into such a state to listen particularly when indignation is not present, because indignation is a self inflicted wound and no one is such a liar as an indignant individual. 

[27] Nietzsche notes the difficulty in communication between those that live at the faster and those at the slower tempo. He explains that the interpretation and refinement of knowledge between such friends offers an amusing playground for misunderstanding and personal entertainment. 

[28] Nietzsche uses tempo as an allegory here to highlight the difficulties to translate "truth" because it is necessary for it to discharge it's content. He asserts that honest interpretations fail to render such ideas. "Truth" then is developed in profuse variety Nietzsche explains, and one thinker after another leaps forward in tempo yet none could have endured life without another. 

[29] Nietzsche asserts that independence from "truth" is uncommon and not for the feint hearted. There is no obligation to make such an endeavour and one who makes such a goal his pursuit is daring. There is considerable risk above the risks life already presents one of which is the possibility of obliviously loosing your way. Nietzsche advises that when the pangs of conscience resound there is no falling back on the sympathy of other humans for such an individual. 

[30] Nietzsche notes that deepest insights will appear as foolishness to those that are not disposed to hear them. He distinguishes between two types of individuals the exoteric [general public] and the esoteric [select few]. These are not so much distinct groups as individuals looking at the world from different perspectives. The former are below looking upward whilst the latter from above looking down. Nietzsche explains the latter operate from the heights at which no tragedy appears tragic. Therefore that which nourishes the latter is poison to the former but the latter might fall and be honoured in the former. For the latter there are dangerous and disturbing books and the former there are books that call the bravest to their own conception of bravery. 

[31] Nietzsche explains that nuance is the best gain of life given the cost of falling upon others with "yes" or "no". Yet that which is unconditional is ridiculed and no more apparently so than among the youthful that will not rest until they have falsified all to vent it's passion upon it. Nietzsche asserts that when finally this passion turns upon itself it revenges itself for it's own blindness [as though this were a voluntary condition], yet later still on understands this was also only youth. 

[32] Nietzsche highlights that for a time the value of an action was inferred from it's consequence. This was likely due to the retrospective power of success or failure that encouraged men to think well or ill of an action on the basis of the outcome. Nietzsche refers to this period as the "PRE-MORAL". He highlights that there was a fundamental shift in thought brought about likely by further refinement to decide the origin decides it's worth. The value of an act lays then in the value of intention and under this the guise of moral praise and blame are bestowed. Nietzsche refers to this period as the "MORAL". He asserts that perhaps a fundamental shift is needed again as we stand on the threshold of the "ULTRA-MORAL" period. Whereby the decisive value of an action is in that which is not intentional. Intention is a sign [or perhaps a symptom] of moral prejudice, something of the realm of astrology / alchemy which must be overcome. This is a task Nietzsche claims for the most refined and wicked conscience of today. 

[33] Nietzsche asserts that the sentiment to sacrifice the self for another should be called to account. Is such a sentiment not perhaps deceptions that please him who hold them to be the case and enjoy such an outcome? 

[34] Nietzsche notes that from whatever viewpoint of philosophy there is error in our supposition that the world we think is most sure and certain. Philosophers that regard space, time, form and movement as deluded would have good reason to become distrustful also of thought. What guarantee do we have that it would not deceive us? Nietzsche highlights the moral naivete in a belief in immediate certainties. Why not deception? He suggest that if distrust is the sign of "bad character" that the Philosopher more than any has a right to "bad character" if anything he is under obligation to distrustfulness. Nietzsche enquires the value of supposing there is an opposition of "true" and "false"? Is it not sufficient to suppose degree's of seemingness? Nietzsche enquires why we should believe the world is not a fiction, and if it is time to cast off such faith. 

[36] Nietzsche posits that if one were to assume the reality of nothing else but our desires and passions would this not be sufficient for understanding the mechanical world? Not as a "representation" but as maintaining the same degree of reality as our emotions. These desires and passions assembly in a mighty unity called life. Nietzsche suggests that it is reasonable to conclude that one type of causality rather than many exist [until we exhaust this possibility]. It is therefore reasonable again to recognise life operating as a single unified "will". If we recognise this will as operating we believe in the causality of the will. Where the effects of the will are recognised in the material world we acknowledge it's power extends to the material world. It is reasonable to conclude then that all mechanical action is the product of this will and that all organic functions could be traced back to will to power. Nietzsche concludes that all active force is therefore will to power and nothing else. 

[38] Nietzsche asserts that, as exemplified in the French revolution, reinterpretation from a distance has ensured noble posterity might misunderstand the whole of the past to make it's portion endurable. 

[39] Nietzsche asserts that nobody except the idealists regard doctrine as true simply because it makes humans happy or virtuous. Happiness and virtue are no argument and unhappiness and wickedness are just as little counter arguments. Nietzsche explains that something might be true but be the greatest danger. Indeed one might succumb by a full knowledge of it. Strength may in fact be measured in such a situation by the extent to which truth is veiled. In such situations the wicked might be best placed to achieve success. Nietzsche notes for the idealists the wicked may very well be happy [and interestingly the moralists tend to ignore this point]! Perhaps severity and craft are more useful conditions for the development of strong individuals or philosophers than the refined gentle learned man. 

[40] Nietzsche asserts that every profound thing avoids clarity and likeness. Nietzsche highlights that there are delicate situations which we desire overwhelmingly to remember differently. Many are able to abuse their own memory to have vengeance in secret; shame is inventive.
There is not only deceit behind a mask but much goodness in fabrication. A human with something costly and fragile would otherwise clumsily stumble through life as a result of the refinement of shame. Nietzsche explains that one with shame takes paths few would ever reach. He regains security in his concealment of mortal danger. The mask of himself Nietzsche asserts shall occupy his place in the hearts and heads of friends. Owing to the false, superficial interpretation of every word he utters and every sign of life he manifests. 

[41] Nietzsche asserts the individual must establish before himself as judge if he is for independence. He must not clear to another human, a homeland, sympathy, science, liberation or virtue he must learn to conserve himself. 

[42] Nietzsche asserts that a new kind of philosopher is beginning to appear one that wishes to remain something of an enigma [given refinement is overrated!] he might dare to call them tempters [or rather it's certainly a temptation to do so]! 

[43] Nietzsche asserts that such individuals will still undoubtedly cleave to "truth" given Philosophy's preoccupation with it, but he asserts they will not be dogmatists. Such individuals will not look for consensus given people have no right to it. Good will be deeply personal given the idea of common good is an oxymoron given what is common is typically of little value. The great things remain for the great and the abysses for the profound. 

[44] Nietzsche asserts that such philosophers will be something profoundly natural a most "free spirit". Nietzsche concedes there are those that desire the opposite and these are the superficial the cause of all human misery and failure. They seek the security, safety and comfort of all life. Their usual song is "equality of rights" and "sympathy with all sufferers". Nietzsche asserts that suffering is something looked upon by them as something to be done away with. 

Yet Nietzsche asserts we have seen how this actually always takes place under the opposite conditions. Dangerousness must increase for human inventive [refinement] and dissembling [spirit] to develop, under extended and oppressive compulsion, that his will to life increased might increase to become will to power. That everything wicked serves as well for the elevation of the human species as it's opposite. We "free spirits" find ourselves at the other extreme of all modern ideology. We are silent as we do not wish to betray what a spirit can free itself from and where it then may be driven - beyond good and evil. 

Nietzsche suggests that having been at home in many realms of the spirit in which preference, prejudice, youth, origin seem to confine us. We are grateful for distress because it frees us of some rule and prejudice, inquisitive to a fault with teeth and stomach for the most indigestible suggestions. The born jealous friends of solitude, our own profoundest midnight and midday solution. Nietzsche concludes this chapter by asserting that such are the free spirits or new philosophers!