In
this essay I intend to consider what Nietzsche and Kierkegaard mean
when they refer to the term 'truth'. I aim to do this by firstly
considering each view in kind before turning my attention to how
these views differ and the implications of both. To begin with I will
consider Nietzsche's understanding of the question of truth.
For
Nietzsche the question of truth serves only to illuminate the
'prejudice of the philosopher'. By the term prejudice I believe
Nietzsche is referring to a belief an individual already maintains to
be true. In Nietzsche's opinion if I were to follow my reasoning to
it's source I would discover it has originated from a belief I
already hold. I am led along a path I have determined for myself and
any conclusion I draw will affirm the ideas I already maintain are
evidently true; as though I what I am actually engaged in is a
peculiar form of self-affirmation rather than 'truth seeking'. In
Nietzsche's opinion a conclusion of something being true or not is
more likely to indicate where my prejudices lie, than whether
something is true or not. Truth for Nietzsche becomes a means by
which individuals advocate their perspective.
For
example an individual may believe that it is just to obey the law.
When presented with the dilemma of an unjust law he chooses to obey
the law because of his belief that it is just to obey the law.
Equally another individual may maintain the same belief that it is
just to obey the law but chooses to disobey an unjust law. Both may
adamantly believe that they are acting in accordance with what is
true, however what this reveals to us is the prejudice of that
individual. The former evidently is concerned with adherence of the
letter of the law whilst the latter the spirit of the law. At times
the individual may not even grasp that his prejudice continues to
distort his 'truth seeking'; elements of his culture and times
permeate his reasoning to develop a subtle contextual bias of which
the individual may not even be aware.
Nietzsche
would suggest, therefore, there is no such thing as an "objective"
point of view. I cannot ascertain if something remains objectively
true because there is no such thing as the "pure, will-less,
painless, timeless knowing subject" able to reason without his
or her own perspective clouding his view of truth. Yet despite his
severe criticism of objectivity, Nietzsche advocates that the more
perspectives we can attain on a matter, the more complete our concept
of a thing will become. We assemble the puzzle with as many pieces as
we can to get a better picture of the object of our enquiry. However
we must acknowledge that our view will be incomplete.
Kierkegaard
notes of objective truth that it is passionless in so far as it is
concerned with the truth as an object "to which the knower is
related"; It is concerned with the nature of objects in the
world and not my relationship with them. The claim "That is
cold" is only objectively true if the temperature of that object
reflects the claim made about it. It requires verification that is
independent of the subject making the claim. Kierkegaard suggests
that the objective accent falls on what is said; objectivity is
concerned with the validity of statements made regarding objects in
the world. Objective truth is not concerned with subjects and their
experience of the world. Objectivity will not tell me if the object
is of value or not. In this way Kierkegaard distinguishes the
subjective and objective.
Kierkegaard
in the "Concluding Unscientific Post Script" states "An
objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the
most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable
for the individual.". What I believe Kierkegaard is suggesting
is that something which remains distinctly unsure yet deeply desired
to be the case is the greatest truth possible. This is not so much a
synthesis of objectivity and subjectivity as it is both held
paradoxically in tension.
That
my wife loves me remains objectively uncertain; no attempts on my
part to identify her love as true love can objectively validate her
love for me. Yet this is something I desire deeply to be the case and
in my experience it has become truth. Paradoxically I am as convinced
of my uncertainty of her love, as I am her love for me. It is because
of my relationship with object of my affection that I know I am
loved. In this way Kierkegaard is able to make the statement
"subjectivity is truth".
In
my reading of Kierkegaard I have considered also that the term
"subjective" could unhelpfully be interpreted as something
which detracts in a negative or pejorative way from the concept of
truth. As though because something is subjectively true it should be
considered synonymous with unreliability or untruth. However this
does not appear to be Kierkegaards suggestion given his suggestion
that the subjective truth is a truth for me that results in a passion
of inwardness that is worth my commitment.
In
venturing a summary of both positions Nietzsche would appear to
suggest that any statement of truth exposes an individuals prejudice
or bias and Kierkegaard that the greatest truth attainable is a
passionate faith. At first glance It may be observed that any
passionate faith would certainly constitute a belief or prejudice,
however Kierkegaards point is that this passionate faith is the
greatest truth this individual could attain. Kierkegaard does not
advocate a move beyond faith and consequently it appears that he is
in agreement with Nietzsche at this point; both positions advocate
that subjective truth is as far as we can go. What appears distinct
with Kierkegaard (to mix term) is the subjects relationship with his
belief; that whilst staring into the abyss of the objective
uncertainty his passion becomes sufficient. What is distinct between
Nietzsche's position and Kierkegaards is not the definition of truth
but if that definition is of value or not. Furthermore Nietzsche's
indirect route to objectivity through the acquisition of multiple
perspectives may offer a means by which individuals can attain a
clearer view of an object however it may also be argued that
compounding perspectives may simply compound the distorting beliefs.
