Beyond Good and Evil :: Illuminating the Natural History of Morals

Within this Chapter Nietzsche addresses attempts to reflect upon the origin and nature of morality. He firstly criticises the lack of critical reflection upon the possibility that morality is not a definite thing. That moral decisions are time and decision specific; morality as the flora of context [time and decision specific]. He notes that morality can profess much about the proponent. Specifically the proponents willingness to obey and his belief in the necessity for others to do likewise. Following this line of reasoning Nietzsche concludes that every system of Morals then is a tyranny. The belief that "Thou must obey some one, and for a long time; OTHERWISE thou wilt come to grief, and lose all respect for thyself".

Nietzsche suggests that ultimately the reasons for moral obedience are illusive and that it is unlikely we will truly understand what motivates compliance in humans. We simply observe a large number of people who obey a small number of people that command. Yet to lead means to step outside the moral order of things. It weakens man to make peace with the existence of warring values. Should this conflict instead become a renewed source of life then he has potential to become one that conquers.

Nietzsche offers several critiques of utilitarianism indicating that such an ideal is built upon the faulty premise that we (a) decide what is good, and (b) interpret our behaviour to fit our conception of the good. Yet Nietzsche criticises such thinking as nothing more than suggestions of behaviour modification to avoid self inflicted danger [do X to maximise happiness as though utility was the end most desirable]. In his opinion such suggestions have no greater value than homeopathic recipes or old wives tales. Human behaviour is far too nuanced for such generalisations. The implication that only stupid people do wrong [if they only knew what would make them happy and that in suffering I might gain nothing] and that doing wrong is not desirable.

As long as the moral litmus is group utility Nietzsche concludes there can be no good actions by the individual. An action such as charity can no longer be considered good independently, given the measure is the outcome for the herd not the receiver of charity. How much or how little danger to the community is contained within an opinion or action becomes the new moral standard. To stand alone even with good reason is to threaten the herd. Aspirations of mediocrity then attain the highest honour given they threaten the herd the least. Yet impotent and mediocre man is not the end game. Such a moral ideal is built upon the utopic vision that if we could do away with danger morality would not be necessary.

Nietzsche asserts that man has proven himself to be a herd animal. Precisely what is good and what is evil is nothing more than the instinct of the herd that prevails. An autonomous herd, proposed by socialists, does away with any kind of master slave distinction. The natural conclusion of which is the removal of rights; further still the opposition of rights given such rights are no longer necessary. Where then can man find hope for the species? Nietzsche indicates that what is necessary are original minds strong enough to initiate opposite estimates of value. To teach man the future of humanity as his will, his desire. To train and educate to avoid the foolish repetition of chance that has so far prevailed. Such leaders are necessary and the stark reality is they may never arrive. He who knows the herd and those [socialists] that seek to place the great alongside the weak -and make nothing more of man than a gregarious animal- knows such a frightening reality is possible; and perhaps may be motivated to act to prevent such a calamity.

Beyond Good and Evil :: The Natural History of Morals

[186] According to Nietzsche "Science of Morals" has fallen foul of becoming refined and presumptuous. Philosophers have pursued the mythological philosophers stone; a "basis" or foundation to morality. Little consideration has been given to the possibility that there could be a problem with morality, or more precisely a difficulty with identifying a basis for something which is both context and time specififc. No philosopher hitherto has considered the possibility of types: the collection and classification of sentiments of worth which live, grow, propagate, and perish. The maliable and ever changing face of morality have instead simply been accepted on good faith. Nietzsche asserts that this is no greater exemplified than within schopenhauers philosophy. That despite his proclamation of pessimism and refutation of God and the world he accepts on good faith the basis that "hurt nobody on the contrary help everybody as much as you can" forms the basic principle of morality [simply a restating of the golden rule]. There is an inauthentic irony in such a claim.

[187] Nietzsche enquires what a system of Morals can tell us about the individual proposing it. Some are to justify or glorify the individual or specific actions they take, others to satisfy the individual others to crucify himself and those on whom he is after revenge. Others still seek power, dominion or creative licence over man to make him in his own image. Kant is one such individual whom indicates his own willingness to obey and the necessity for others to do likewise.

[188] Nietzsche asserts every system of Morals then is a tyranny against nature. He acknowledges such an observation is not an objection to tyranny unless this morality finds that all tyranny against nature is unlawful [thereby becoming an ironic tautology]. Nietzsche asserts the freedom enjoyed today by the moralists who profess liberty has only been won by means of such a tyranny. Nietzsche asserts that it is most likely that such a tyranny is natural and that the appearance of letting go is actually adherence to countless laws. That what is necessary is obedience in the same direction to achieve the same results. Progress is therefore nothing more than refinement and avoidance of the arbitrary after all. Nietzsche explains such heights of human achievement are what the moralists propose makes life worth living. This long bondage which the thinker inflicts upon himself to play by the rules is where the European spirit draws its strength: mobility and curiosity (albeit with much spirit suffocated and stifled in the process). Yet such a process exhibits "nature" in all her indifferent glory. Historically European man only thought to prove something [his existence perhaps] whereas now man is suspicious of anyone trying to prove anything. Conclusions are pre-agreed; it is after all for the "glory of God". Such is the narrowing of perspectives brought about by slave morality. Nietzsche concludes that the only moral imperative which he can identify is that "Thou must obey some one, and for a long time; OTHERWISE thou wilt come to grief, and lose all respect for thyself". It is neither categorical nor addressed to the individual. It is instead addressed to the animal "man".

[189] Nietzsche asserts that the   sacred value that man place upon Sundays was a stroke of English genius. Idleness does not come naturally to the industrious and during such a fast of activity one learns humility and submission, whilst at the same time being purified and sharpened. Within this paradox the Christian sentiments for sexual impulses were sublimated to become love.

[190] Nietzsche explains that within popular reasoning lies the view that error occurs through ignorance. Perceiving the unpleasantness of evil and identifying the good as useful they conclude that only the stupid do wrong. Nietzsche indicates that such thinking is typically indicative of utilitarianism; to decide upon the good and to interpret myself into my tenants.

[191] Nietzsche asserts the oldest problem of morality is that of whether faith [instinct] or reason deserves the greater authority. For Socrates it was the latter and he laughed at the incapacity of athenian nobles as he exposed their lack of knowledge. But this was his inauthentic movement given he advocated one should use reason as a tool to support his instincts. As such he deceived his conscience to the point of outwitting himself, falling foul of the utilitarian trap of interpreting himself into his tenants. Descartes on the other hand recognised the authority of reason but only at a very superficial level.

[192] Nietzsche asserts when faced with the possibility of something new man attempts to reconcile it with what he already believes to be the case. Much in the same way we hear a language and attempt to recognise within it familiar words. We see or read something and guess it's intention or meaning rather than clarifying what is actually meant; we recall an individual making an expression in conversation vividly in perhaps a way that they didn't but it appeared to us so. As such we are more accustomed to lying than we realise. Or to put it more politely one is more of an artist than one is aware of.

[193] Nietzsche asserts that what we frequently dream is just as much a part of us as anything we experience in the real world. For one who believes he can make such dreams a reality on the slightest impulse without constraint as he battles uphill and trouble as he decends again. How could he fail? Surely what the poets speak of is simply too much trouble, to violent for him.

[194] The distinction between men is not restricted alone to what they consider to be of value but also what they regard as desirable. With regards to women one man perceives faithfulness as possession, another considers the self denial on behalf of one's husband while a third has his devilry discovered and only considers her possessed when she loves him despite his wickedness. Within each individual man finds an unobjectionable opportunity for a new possession. That which he can shape and mould into his own image.

[195] Nietzsche highlights that it is with the Jews that the inversion of values emerged as they sought to possess and shape man in their image.

[196] Nietzsche uses the allegory of "many dark bodies near the sun we shall never see" an allegory to adequately highlight that the psychological motives behind moral compliance. They are nuanced and opaque.

[197] Nietzsche explains that as long as one perceives a morbidity in the beast and man of prey or even some innate evil within them as all moralists do. Nietzsche highlights that all moralists seek to discredit the biological man in his Infancy as somehow a disease or degeneracy. Is this not just morality as timidity!?

[198] Nietzsche criticises systems of utility as nothing more than suggestion of behaviour modification to avoid self inflicted danger. These in his opinion have no greater value than homeopathic recipes or old wives tales; generalising where no generalisations are possible. It is far from scientific or reasonable.

[199] Nietzsche introduces the concept of the herd; a large number of people who obey a small number of people that command. This desire to obey indicates a yearning within man proportionate to his strength, a formal conscience insistent upon whatever "thou shalt" is whispered into its ear be it by teachers, parents or public opinion. This herd instinct to obedience is transmitted at the cost of command. Bad conscience then is the self deception that permits one to lead without feeling as though one has stepped outside the moral order of things. European man glorifies himself as though he was the only kind of man permissible and this gregarious peculiarly human paragon of virtue seeks to replace those born to command.

[200] Nietzsche explains that the man that accepts contrary and warring standards of value within himself will be weak. His fundamental aim is that the war within himself would cease, with happiness a soothing balm. Should however this conflict become a renewed source of life then he has potential to become one that conquers others. The types are complimentary and spring from the same cause.

[201] Nietzsche asserts that as long as the utility that determines social estimates is one concerned only with herd happiness there can be no moral basis for the love for ones neighbour. Whilst there may be the activity of instincts referred to as "virtues" a sympathetic action is neither good nor bad given it must always be considered in relation to the welfare of the whole herd. Love for one's neighbour then is only a secondary matter manifest in relation to our fear of our neighbour. How much or how little danger to the community is contained within an opinion becomes the new moral standard. The will to stand alone and even cogent reasons for doing so are perceived as threats and henceforth called an evil. The mediocrity of desires attains the highest honour given it threatens the herd the least; "the sheep" wins respect. As such society takes the part of man that hurts it: "the criminal" and punishes it. Yet is it not sufficient that man be rendered impotent, harmless and ineffective? As such this gregarious morality exposes the fact that if one could do away with danger this morality would not be necessary. It is built upon the utopic vision that one day there will be nothing to fear. For the progressive then the name for the will and way towards this vision is called progress.

[202] Nietzsche asserts that whilst it might prove offensive to describe him as such; man has proven himself to be a herd animal. The moral consensus we observe across Europe and within countries of European influence are indicative of just this. What socrates believed he didn't know, and what the serpent promised to teach us: precisely what is good and what is evil. Yet this is nothing more than the instinct of the herd that prevails. Morality within Europe Nietzsche asserts is herding animal morality. This is only one form of morality beyond which a higher morality may emerge. Against such a possibility this morality defends itself with all its fervent strength. "I am morality itself and nothing else is morality!". With the help of religion such a morality has become more prevalent and obvious yet it is too slow for the socialists who seek an autonomous herd and to do away with any kind of  master slave distinction. To do away with any advantage of one over another the natural conclusion of which is the removal of rights; further still the opposition of rights given they are no longer necessary. Such individuals are one in their distrust of punitive justice, in their sympathy for all, in their hatred of suffering, in the practice of mutual sympathy as morality, in their belief of community as deliverer and their belief in themselves.

[203] Nietzsche enquires where those that recognise such a man as a dying species should seek hope? In original minds strong enough to initiate opposite estimates of value. To teach man the future of humanity as his will. To train and educate to avoid the foolish repetition of chance. For this purpose a new kind of philosopher is necessary one whose task all things abhorrent pale in comparison. Nietzsche questions the lawfulness of even mentioning the conditions within which one would arise and feel a constraint to these tasks. One requiring sturdy conscience and heart. Yet such leaders are necessary and the reality is they may never arrive. Yet few pains are as debilitating as having observed man degenerate. He who sees this sees all that man could become. He knows better still the tragedy when the greatest possibilities of man have broken down. He who knows the degeneracy of man as idealised by the socialists that seek to place the great alongside the weak and make nothing more of him than a gregarious animal, knows this is possible; and perhaps also a new mission.