Kant/Hume: Causality

In this essay I will attempt to examine Kant's claim that causation is an a priori category. I will attempt to do this by first examining Hume's understanding of causation, describing what is meant by the terms necessary and sufficient conditions before finally contrasting Humes understanding with Kant's view and offering some evaluation of both arguments.

Hume argues that causation involves an association between a cause and an effect. He argues that Humans have a propensity to conclude that there is a necessary connection between the cause and the effect. So that when I see event A occurring I might always conclude B will occur. Hume denies that any such condition actually exists attributing this to our imagination. To better understand Humes description of causal relationships we should first understand what is meant by the terms necessary and sufficient.

For Hume a necessary condition is one in which the effect will not occur if the cause is not present. As a child I removed the light bulb from my night light and stuck a finger into the electrical socket to ascertain if I would light up much like the bulb. Whilst my childhood curiosity was soon quelled by the resultant mains shock. From this shock I drew a conclusion; if I do not stick my finger in the bulb socket I will not receive an electrical shock.
 

If this example is understood as a necessary condition this perspective is problematic. I might stick my finger into the socket and not receive a shock because the lamp is not plugged in, or switched off. Furthermore if wearing nylon or synthetic clothes I become statically charged and happen to shake hands with another person; I would experience an electrical shock that is not consistent with the necessary condition I have associated with the effect of being shocked. Put differently It does not therefore always follow that electrical shocks can be avoided by refraining from touching electrical sockets. 

A sufficient cause is one in which if the cause is present the effect will occur. For example I may posit that if the temperature drops below zero degrees centigrade my windscreen will be covered with ice in the morning. This statement again is also problematic in that the sufficient cause may not accounting for the scope of variables that actually result in my windscreen accumulating ice. For example the presence of water vapor in the air, the temperature within the car and of the windscreen, if I choose to cover my windscreen and so on may impact on the presence of ice on my windscreen. 

It appears that for Hume that both necessary and sufficient causes fail to account for the scope of variables that may influence a particular effect. A robust collection of variables becomes necessary and arguably may no longer represent an identifiable cause. If an association between cause and effect exists it does not appear that I am able to offer an explicit description.

Kant attempts to escape Humes problem by asserting that Causality is one of the categories of understanding. By this Kant is referring to the categories of the conceptual scheme by which we understand the world. Kant had argued that the passive reception of experience was not sufficient to explain Human knowledge. Kant asserted that to arrive at knowledge humans required a means to interpret information and believed that specific categories were a part of our mental apparatus. Much like a computer which stores an electronic file as thousands of bits of binary data (1's and 0's) there has to be a means by which we make sense of sense data otherwise the data is meaningless. 

For Kant, that we perceive the causal relationship as necessary is because our mental apparatus constrains us to perceive it this way; that we perceive the cause and effect relationship as necessary is because this is how our understanding organises this information. Kant's argument however is not without difficulty. Firstly it raises the question in relation to causation, how can we be certain that our understanding of any causal sequence is not distorted? Furthermore, and more significantly if one category of the conceptual scheme has the potential to influence or even 'distort' our perception of the world does this mean others can also? More concerningly If this is the case – how can we be sure that what we perceive actually reflects the real world? 

Arguably here Kant here does not escape Hume's problem but merely rephrases it. Hume has argued that our perception of the causal relationship as necessary is imagined and Kant has dismissed this as the wrong conclusion from the available information. Both suggest that we are in some way predisposed to perceive the world contrary to how is actually is. Here there appears to be a striking similarity in how both have attempted to dismiss this problem by attributing it to simply being in error. Furthermore it appears tautological for Hume to conclude that imagination necessarily causes us to believe causes are necessary and Kant to argue that necessarily our conceptual schema causes us to perceive causes as necessary.

Kant/Hume: Conceptual Schemes

In this essay intend to consider Hume's criticism of induction. I will further consider how Immanuel Kant seeks to avoids what he perceives as Hume's solipsism through his application of the conceptual scheme. I will endeavor to do this by firstly considering how Hume understands we acquire knowledge about the world and then secondly considering Kant's objection and proposed solution.

Hume asserts that statements can be divided between two distinct groups. The first group he called the 'relations of ideas' which are statements about ideas arrived at by means of deduction. These analytic statements are discoverable by reason alone, and into this group fall mathematics and statements such as "2 + 2 = 4". Their scope is limited to only the relationship between ideas and, according to Hume, cannot tell us anything about the world. 

Hume asserts that the latter group of statements are 'matters of fact'. Hume here is referring to statements about the world which are attained by means of induction. Hume later criticises induction; his objective here appears to have been to evidence that certainty is not present within scientific enquiry. Hume suggests that it is always logically possible that any given statement about the world is false.

Hume asserts that induction is a means of drawing a general principle from a series of specific examples to arrive at knowledge about the world. As aforementioned Hume has already asserted that knowledge about the world cannot be arrived at by deductive reasoning. His rationale being that statements about ideas necessitate a priori knowledge (knowledge before experience) and that the world can only be known a posteriori (knowledge through experience). Hume concludes then that if any given statement about the world could be false, inductive reasoning cannot yield certainty.

To understand Hume's claim here let me consider for a moment my wallet. If I were to draw a coin from my wallet it might be a 50p coin. I draw another coin from my wallet and discovered it was again a 50p coin. I repeat the exercise several times, each time withdrawing a 50p coin. I might claim that the last coin I withdrew was a 50p coin, and therefore the next coin will be a 50p coin. However the only way I could assert such a claim would be to conclude that the future will resemble the past. The type of coin I will withdraw is contingent upon what coins are actually in my wallet. Hume's criticism of inductive reasoning is that to yield certainty we must assume that our future experience will remember past experiences. Given this is a statement about the world Hume asserts this statement could be false.

Kant disagreed with Hume that the world is only known a posteriori. Hume had asserted that the mind is effectively tablua rasa at birth, with no knowledge about the world prior to experience. Kant disagreed with the idea that the mind is passive recipient of sense data. Kant suggested that the passive reception of sense data was not sufficient to explain Human knowledge. Kant argued that something has to be done with the sense data received in order to arrive at knowledge. Kant proposes therefore that the mind is not simply a passive recipient of sense data; the mind is active and does something with the sense data rather than nothing. 

Kant believed that the sense data is organised according to specific categories which are a part of what we are these are known as Kant's conceptual schemes. Consider for a moment that this essay is stored on the computer as an electronic file. The file is broken down into hundreds and thousands of what are called bits. A bit is a data type that can have two possible values either a 1 or 0. This sequence of binary data -much like Kant believed sense data would be for humans- is essentially useless to the machine unless there is a means by which it can be interpreted. Kant proceeds to argue that we do not receive uninterpreted sense data but that the data we receive has already been understood by means of twelve categories of understanding he suggests are part of what we are.

Kant asserts that as the sense data has already been interpreted, our knowledge and perceptions are not of the 'thing itself' but 'the thing as it appears to us'. Kant distinguishes these objects as the noumena (the 'thing itself') and the phenomena (the 'thing as it appears to us'). Kant asserts that it is not possible for us to access the noumena but that the phenomena is derivative of noumana by means of our conceptual scheme (means of processing sensory data). Whilst Humans may be have twelve categories of understanding, other species may hold different conceptual schemes and therefore percieve the world very differently.

To illustrate the difference between noumena and it's derivative phenomena; consider for a moment a kettle in a well illuminated room. My visual sense perception of the kettle is limited to the visible light spectrum; I perceive it as a particular shape and colour; seeing that it is white and likely made from cheap plastic half filled with still water. I am unable to perceive heat, so without touching the kettle I can't detect if it is warm, hot or cold. Whilst this is a poor example (given my perception of the kettle being warm, hot or cold is already an interpretation of sense data) the point here is that the kettle with all it's attributes (including hot and cold) is the noumena. I can perceive the kettle through my conceptual schema but some properties I am simply unable to access. The Kettle as I perceive it is the phenomena.

Hume: On Miracles

In this essay I intend to describe the argument made by Hume in his essay on miracles, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of his position. Hume defines a miracle as a "violation of a law of nature". By so doing Hume excludes colloquial usage such as "It's a miracle I made it on time", or "It's a miracle the car didn't break down". His intention appears to be to define miracles as some kind of interference by a deity in the natural order of the world rather than a highly improbable event. 

 

Hume proceeds to propose a series of arguments to suggest that miracles are impossible. Hume highlights that by definition a law is immutable and therefore miracles cannot occur because a laws cannot be both "violated and immutable". Turning his attention to accounts of Biblical miracles, he specifically makes mention of the first miracle of Jesus. Hume asserts that our past experience has shown that water turning into wine generally does not happen and therefore reports of it happening should be treated with scepticism. He proposes that on a balance of probability it is more likely that a miracle has not occurred.

With such arguments Hume suggests that testimony or miracles should not be believed, asserting that we could only conclude a miracle had occurred if the arguments against were "more miraculous". He suggests that there are two responses to such testimony. The first is to believe and the second is to believe that the individual in question is either mistaken or lying. Given our experience of the world, on a balance of probability Hume suggest the appropriate response is to believe the latter. 

 

Hume enquires further as to why god might interfere in one situation and not another, or choose one location or circumstance in which to act over another. In the event that two believers were buried in an earthquake and one survived, attributing it to his fervent prayer for salvation, it might be concluded at best god is fickle and at worst harshly that the second believer simply did not have faith. 

 

In his essay on Miracles Hume identifies the problem "How do we recognise a miracle?" Many cultures believed (and some cultures still maintain) that unusual behaviour, symptomatic of ill mental health, is caused by spirit possession. With the rise of Psychological and Psychiatric disciplines Catholic Priests now consult with mental health professionals to first exclude the possibility of a natural explanation before conferring any religious significance to an individuals affliction. Hume suggest that the attribution of religious significance to natural phenomena is the hallmark of the failure to understand the underlying cause. 

 

Whilst it is possible a camera may be considered miraculous by someone from 1000 years ago, the possibility of ignorance presents the problem of how one actually establishes what a natural law is and then determines that it has been violated. If we believe as Hume does that we learn about the world through experience, by choosing to believe that rarer or unusual phenomena did not exist we would limit our world view and our picture of the world in which we live would be incomplete. This would seem an illogical disdain for irregularities in the natural order of the world, by one seeking to understand it, when further enquiry may provide greater understanding.

Further still How does one establish the natural laws governing highly unusual or rare phenomena (for example ball lightning), or phenomena we are only beginning to understand such as abiogenesis? Where our experience is severely limited and conjecture and theory may not prove as convincing to a specific culture as an all powerful deity or an intelligent engineer. It is very possible therefore that the accepted belief by a society in this instance may prove unpalatable to Hume. Hume's response might perhaps be to suggest that "increasing knowledge and culture would leave no room for such stories". But until the phenomena was truly known, such a position as the former would remain one of faith.

Critically Hume does not appear to have arrived at his definition by mean of repeated observations of the violation of natural laws. His argument is prescriptive rather than descriptive. If Hume is consistent in his assertion than we learn about the world through experience then there must be scope for a more complete understanding of the world in which we live. Until evidence is provided to support Hume's claim, miracles may simply be the way we interpret phenomenon for which we have no knowledge and experience.

In conclusion whilst Hume's arguments are not without weakness but more importantly Hume has highlighted important questions of philosophical significance including the difficulties in recognising miracles, and the seemingly arbitrary choice of god to intervene in one situation and not another. Hume's effort also highlights the difficulty in distinguishing miracles from improbable and rare phenomena.

Kierkegaard/Nietzsche: Truth

In this essay I intend to consider what Nietzsche and Kierkegaard mean when they refer to the term 'truth'. I aim to do this by firstly considering each view in kind before turning my attention to how these views differ and the implications of both. To begin with I will consider Nietzsche's understanding of the question of truth.   

For Nietzsche the question of truth serves only to illuminate the 'prejudice of the philosopher'. By the term prejudice I believe Nietzsche is referring to a belief an individual already maintains to be true. In Nietzsche's opinion if I were to follow my reasoning to it's source I would discover it has originated from a belief I already hold. I am led along a path I have determined for myself and any conclusion I draw will affirm the ideas I already maintain are evidently true; as though I what I am actually engaged in is a peculiar form of self-affirmation rather than 'truth seeking'. In Nietzsche's opinion a conclusion of something being true or not is more likely to indicate where my prejudices lie, than whether something is true or not. Truth for Nietzsche becomes a means by which individuals advocate their perspective.

For example an individual may believe that it is just to obey the law. When presented with the dilemma of an unjust law he chooses to obey the law because of his belief that it is just to obey the law. Equally another individual may maintain the same belief that it is just to obey the law but chooses to disobey an unjust law. Both may adamantly believe that they are acting in accordance with what is true, however what this reveals to us is the prejudice of that individual. The former evidently is concerned with adherence of the letter of the law whilst the latter the spirit of the law. At times the individual may not even grasp that his prejudice continues to distort his 'truth seeking'; elements of his culture and times permeate his reasoning to develop a subtle contextual bias of which the individual may not even be aware.

Nietzsche would suggest, therefore, there is no such thing as an "objective" point of view. I cannot ascertain if something remains objectively true because there is no such thing as the "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject" able to reason without his or her own perspective clouding his view of truth. Yet despite his severe criticism of objectivity, Nietzsche advocates that the more perspectives we can attain on a matter, the more complete our concept of a thing will become. We assemble the puzzle with as many pieces as we can to get a better picture of the object of our enquiry. However we must acknowledge that our view will be incomplete.

Kierkegaard notes of objective truth that it is passionless in so far as it is concerned with the truth as an object "to which the knower is related"; It is concerned with the nature of objects in the world and not my relationship with them. The claim "That is cold" is only objectively true if the temperature of that object reflects the claim made about it. It requires verification that is independent of the subject making the claim. Kierkegaard suggests that the objective accent falls on what is said; objectivity is concerned with the validity of statements made regarding objects in the world. Objective truth is not concerned with subjects and their experience of the world. Objectivity will not tell me if the object is of value or not. In this way Kierkegaard distinguishes the subjective and objective.

Kierkegaard in the "Concluding Unscientific Post Script" states "An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for the individual.". What I believe Kierkegaard is suggesting is that something which remains distinctly unsure yet deeply desired to be the case is the greatest truth possible. This is not so much a synthesis of objectivity and subjectivity as it is both held paradoxically in tension.

That my wife loves me remains objectively uncertain; no attempts on my part to identify her love as true love can objectively validate her love for me. Yet this is something I desire deeply to be the case and in my experience it has become truth. Paradoxically I am as convinced of my uncertainty of her love, as I am her love for me. It is because of my relationship with object of my affection that I know I am loved. In this way Kierkegaard is able to make the statement "subjectivity is truth". 

In my reading of Kierkegaard I have considered also that the term "subjective" could unhelpfully be interpreted as something which detracts in a negative or pejorative way from the concept of truth. As though because something is subjectively true it should be considered synonymous with unreliability or untruth. However this does not appear to be Kierkegaards suggestion given his suggestion that the subjective truth is a truth for me that results in a passion of inwardness that is worth my commitment.

In venturing a summary of both positions Nietzsche would appear to suggest that any statement of truth exposes an individuals prejudice or bias and Kierkegaard that the greatest truth attainable is a passionate faith. At first glance It may be observed that any passionate faith would certainly constitute a belief or prejudice, however Kierkegaards point is that this passionate faith is the greatest truth this individual could attain. Kierkegaard does not advocate a move beyond faith and consequently it appears that he is in agreement with Nietzsche at this point; both positions advocate that subjective truth is as far as we can go. What appears distinct with Kierkegaard (to mix term) is the subjects relationship with his belief; that whilst staring into the abyss of the objective uncertainty his passion becomes sufficient. What is distinct between Nietzsche's position and Kierkegaards is not the definition of truth but if that definition is of value or not. Furthermore Nietzsche's indirect route to objectivity through the acquisition of multiple perspectives may offer a means by which individuals can attain a clearer view of an object however it may also be argued that compounding perspectives may simply compound the distorting beliefs.