Kierkegaard/Nietzsche: Truth

In this essay I intend to consider what Nietzsche and Kierkegaard mean when they refer to the term 'truth'. I aim to do this by firstly considering each view in kind before turning my attention to how these views differ and the implications of both. To begin with I will consider Nietzsche's understanding of the question of truth.   

For Nietzsche the question of truth serves only to illuminate the 'prejudice of the philosopher'. By the term prejudice I believe Nietzsche is referring to a belief an individual already maintains to be true. In Nietzsche's opinion if I were to follow my reasoning to it's source I would discover it has originated from a belief I already hold. I am led along a path I have determined for myself and any conclusion I draw will affirm the ideas I already maintain are evidently true; as though I what I am actually engaged in is a peculiar form of self-affirmation rather than 'truth seeking'. In Nietzsche's opinion a conclusion of something being true or not is more likely to indicate where my prejudices lie, than whether something is true or not. Truth for Nietzsche becomes a means by which individuals advocate their perspective.

For example an individual may believe that it is just to obey the law. When presented with the dilemma of an unjust law he chooses to obey the law because of his belief that it is just to obey the law. Equally another individual may maintain the same belief that it is just to obey the law but chooses to disobey an unjust law. Both may adamantly believe that they are acting in accordance with what is true, however what this reveals to us is the prejudice of that individual. The former evidently is concerned with adherence of the letter of the law whilst the latter the spirit of the law. At times the individual may not even grasp that his prejudice continues to distort his 'truth seeking'; elements of his culture and times permeate his reasoning to develop a subtle contextual bias of which the individual may not even be aware.

Nietzsche would suggest, therefore, there is no such thing as an "objective" point of view. I cannot ascertain if something remains objectively true because there is no such thing as the "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject" able to reason without his or her own perspective clouding his view of truth. Yet despite his severe criticism of objectivity, Nietzsche advocates that the more perspectives we can attain on a matter, the more complete our concept of a thing will become. We assemble the puzzle with as many pieces as we can to get a better picture of the object of our enquiry. However we must acknowledge that our view will be incomplete.

Kierkegaard notes of objective truth that it is passionless in so far as it is concerned with the truth as an object "to which the knower is related"; It is concerned with the nature of objects in the world and not my relationship with them. The claim "That is cold" is only objectively true if the temperature of that object reflects the claim made about it. It requires verification that is independent of the subject making the claim. Kierkegaard suggests that the objective accent falls on what is said; objectivity is concerned with the validity of statements made regarding objects in the world. Objective truth is not concerned with subjects and their experience of the world. Objectivity will not tell me if the object is of value or not. In this way Kierkegaard distinguishes the subjective and objective.

Kierkegaard in the "Concluding Unscientific Post Script" states "An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for the individual.". What I believe Kierkegaard is suggesting is that something which remains distinctly unsure yet deeply desired to be the case is the greatest truth possible. This is not so much a synthesis of objectivity and subjectivity as it is both held paradoxically in tension.

That my wife loves me remains objectively uncertain; no attempts on my part to identify her love as true love can objectively validate her love for me. Yet this is something I desire deeply to be the case and in my experience it has become truth. Paradoxically I am as convinced of my uncertainty of her love, as I am her love for me. It is because of my relationship with object of my affection that I know I am loved. In this way Kierkegaard is able to make the statement "subjectivity is truth". 

In my reading of Kierkegaard I have considered also that the term "subjective" could unhelpfully be interpreted as something which detracts in a negative or pejorative way from the concept of truth. As though because something is subjectively true it should be considered synonymous with unreliability or untruth. However this does not appear to be Kierkegaards suggestion given his suggestion that the subjective truth is a truth for me that results in a passion of inwardness that is worth my commitment.

In venturing a summary of both positions Nietzsche would appear to suggest that any statement of truth exposes an individuals prejudice or bias and Kierkegaard that the greatest truth attainable is a passionate faith. At first glance It may be observed that any passionate faith would certainly constitute a belief or prejudice, however Kierkegaards point is that this passionate faith is the greatest truth this individual could attain. Kierkegaard does not advocate a move beyond faith and consequently it appears that he is in agreement with Nietzsche at this point; both positions advocate that subjective truth is as far as we can go. What appears distinct with Kierkegaard (to mix term) is the subjects relationship with his belief; that whilst staring into the abyss of the objective uncertainty his passion becomes sufficient. What is distinct between Nietzsche's position and Kierkegaards is not the definition of truth but if that definition is of value or not. Furthermore Nietzsche's indirect route to objectivity through the acquisition of multiple perspectives may offer a means by which individuals can attain a clearer view of an object however it may also be argued that compounding perspectives may simply compound the distorting beliefs.