In this essay I intend to examine Nietzsche's allegory of the Apollonian and Dionysian as a portrait of human nature. To proceed it is helpful to provide some context to this discussion which can be found in Nietzsche's book "The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music". His first literary piece, as a professor of Philology (the humanistic study of language and literature), the book examines classical tragedy as a life-affirming art form. Whilst the book specifically focuses on art, Nietzsche's questioning at the beginning of the book alludes to philosophical application beyond philology.
"Is there a pessimism of strength ? An intellectual inclination for what in existence is hard, dreadful, evil, problematic, emerging from what is healthy, from overflowing well being, from living existence to the full ? Is there perhaps a way of suffering from the very fullness of life?" (N, p3)
Given the specialist nature of Nietzsche's profession, and the associated terminology, it is helpful to at this point define his key terms. Apollo was the God of the sun and light, and for Nietzsche's understanding he represented illumination, reason and order. Nietzsche refers to him as "that fully wise calm of the god of images" (N, p12). So for Nietzsche the Apollonian is the rational man that strives for form and structure to illuminate the form of a thing. In making distinctions between one form and another, for Nietzsche, the Apollonian also contains the individuality of man; by making all things distinct the Apollonian makes man himself distinguishable from others.
Dionysus by contrast was the Greek God of wine and ritualistic frenzy; for Nietzsche he represents the chaotic, unrestrained, instinctual base nature and -by contrast with the Apollonian in thought- the indistinguishable. Nietzsche himself suggests Dionysian thought is "namely, the desire for the ugly , the good strong willing of the ancient Hellenes for pessimism, for tragic myth, for pictures of everything fearful, evil, enigmatic, destructive, and fateful" (N, p3).
Nietzsche suggests that the Dionysian forms the base or foundation of man, yet only as much can surface that can be overcome by the Apollonian; Man for Nietzsche becomes dissonance veiled with beauty. Nietzsche's proposes that these two different drives exist in open conflict, dialectically opposing forces which result in a tragic synthesis. That both the animal and man grapple with one another, as though locked in conflict, proportionately increasing in strength with no victorious party.
As an allegory for human nature this dialectic has evident application. Increasingly as a species we acknowledge our genetic similarity to other species; our Apollonian inquiries reveal evidence for the natural means by which human beings have evolved through a process of natural selection. Yet we see things as beautiful, good, evil, distinct and have built our civilisation upon rational ideas. We as a species distinguish ourselves from the flora and fauna around us and call ourselves 'civilised', aspiring to the Apollonian ideal. In Nietzsche's view we are the Dionysian origin beneath the veil of Apollonian civilisation.
In literature Robert Louis Stevenson's "The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde" written 12 years after Nietzsche's own work, with the obvious internal tensions within the divided protagonist Dr Henry Jekyll, has become something of a popular expression of the divided self. That man has a good, rational and beautiful side is often contrasted in various artistic mediums with his more dark, irreverent, and (perceived or actual) evil tendencies. Yet in this world it is not uncommon to hear our Apollonian way of dismissing our more questionable actions with such ironic phrases as "it was just a moment of madness".
But how does Nietzsche's thought here reflect his later development of the superman? In Nietzsche synthesis of man both the Apollonian and Dionysian are a part of the nature of man. The superman pursues what is life affirming, giving no credence to what is good or evil (or to be more specific to this essay; what is Apollonian or Dionysian), but that he is a true synthesis in equal measure of both the Apollonian and Dionysian. He is a balance individual with no 'neurosis' as Nietzsche suggests, predisposing him to reject his Dionysus and accept the world according to Apollo -unlike the Philosophers that have come before him. For Nietzsche the superman society becomes balanced not on the basis of what is tasteful but on the basis of what affirms life irrespective or the origin of such balance be it Apollonian or Dionysian.
Sunday, 1 November 2015
Sunday, 18 October 2015
Nietzsche: Eternal Recurrence
Nietzsche asserts in 'beyond good and evil' that "If one has character, one also has one’s typical experience which always recurs." (§70) What Nietzsche means by this cryptic aphorism is not clear at first glance and it is my intention to examine, illustrate and evaluate his point in this essay.
Firstly I will consider what Nietzsche lastly refers to with the term "experience which always recurs". What I assume Nietzsche is referring to at this point is the idea that experience is recurrent. That at the moment I am sat typing this essay the decisions that I make should be made such that if they should recurr I would willing to be responsible for them over and over again. This is an unusual claim for Nietzsche and may appear inconsistent with his thought elsewhere. For example Nietzsche exclaims in 'Thus spake Zarathustra..' that proponents of "superearthly" claims are – among other more colourful descriptions– despisers of life. It is perhaps then safe to conclude that Nietzsche does not propose this idea as a fact of nature, but for another reason, the purpose of which may become clearer as we consider his earlier thought, namely in the will to power.
Nietzsche asserts that life itself is will to power; life will strive to spread, flourish and become predominant –in Nietzsche’s words to "discharge it's strength". Nietzsche explains that this is not contingent upon, or constrained by, categories of good and evil; life may be furthered or preserved by acts considered evil or good. If above all things a human being strives for predominance, what then are the implications of this in Nietzsche's recurrent universe? In answer to this question I would like to further examine the first part of Nietzsche's statement "if one has character". To understand this section I will make the assumption that Nietzsche is talking about his concept of the Übermensch or superman. Nietzsche presents the superman as the goal or aim of humankind; my assumption is that the character of which Nietzsche speaks is that of the superman.
Nietzsche's superman is not constrained or limited by conventional morality, nor is he distracted by superearthly or 'metaphysical' claims. He represents the ultimate human being and the highest human attainment. The superman represents man and his transcendence of his himself; in going beyond himself he has the strength to completely accept the past with it's perceived (and actual) failures and to truly will it's eternal return. For Nietzsche the superman is able to will the eternal recurrence because it validates forever all that he has become and should be; nothing greater can he do except to will the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche's concept of the superman then is a helpful illustration of his aphorism; If an individual has the character of the superman he also has a standard experience in every instance of the context he finds himself.
The title of this essay asserts that Nietzsche believes decision ought always be made on the thought experiment of eternal recurrence, but would Nietzsche support this claim? Based on my examination I would agree that he does. For Nietzsche to strive for predominance, and fully actualise my potential and possibility, I should make each decision in such a way that no greater thing can be done.
To illustrate Nietzsche's point I will consider an example. If I was to choose post graduate education I would observe that my aim would be to achieve the best grades, to learn and develop my understanding and ultimately attain the qualification to which my study was orientated. In Nietzsche's view of the will to power I might also have the unconscious (or perhaps conscious but not admitted) desire to become an authority or significant figure in whichever field I might study. What I wouldn't find would be that my aim would be an overwhelming desire to fail or not to succeed in my venture. Nietzsche's will to power makes sense in this context; human beings strive to grow and flourish not to fail.
Taken further, how would my venture in education be affected when confronted with the possibility of eternal recurrence? It is very likely that, in accordance with the will to power, I would strive to discharge the sum of my potential and possibility in every aspect. If confronted with the possibility of living every moment again I would carefully consider each action taken and reflexivity would characterise my decision making process. For fear of missing an opportunity to increase in learning, or to achieve a better grade, there would be no room for apathy or complacency when faced with a decision.
Such a position is not without merit, adopting the view that each decision should carry such weight, might push an individual to achieve a greatness that he might otherwise not attain. The severity and seriousness of such a thought experiment suggests something of the value that Nietzsche places on making considered decisions and the consequence of making poor decisions. That considered such a view is then not without difficulty. The responsibility of making good choices may paralyse me and prevent or delay urgent action when the answer is not clear to me. It is also not always clear that the decision I make is the right or best decision often until after it has been made. I may strive for predominance and order my existence as though faced with the eternal recurrence, yet the outcome may not be desirable.
Firstly I will consider what Nietzsche lastly refers to with the term "experience which always recurs". What I assume Nietzsche is referring to at this point is the idea that experience is recurrent. That at the moment I am sat typing this essay the decisions that I make should be made such that if they should recurr I would willing to be responsible for them over and over again. This is an unusual claim for Nietzsche and may appear inconsistent with his thought elsewhere. For example Nietzsche exclaims in 'Thus spake Zarathustra..' that proponents of "superearthly" claims are – among other more colourful descriptions– despisers of life. It is perhaps then safe to conclude that Nietzsche does not propose this idea as a fact of nature, but for another reason, the purpose of which may become clearer as we consider his earlier thought, namely in the will to power.
Nietzsche asserts that life itself is will to power; life will strive to spread, flourish and become predominant –in Nietzsche’s words to "discharge it's strength". Nietzsche explains that this is not contingent upon, or constrained by, categories of good and evil; life may be furthered or preserved by acts considered evil or good. If above all things a human being strives for predominance, what then are the implications of this in Nietzsche's recurrent universe? In answer to this question I would like to further examine the first part of Nietzsche's statement "if one has character". To understand this section I will make the assumption that Nietzsche is talking about his concept of the Übermensch or superman. Nietzsche presents the superman as the goal or aim of humankind; my assumption is that the character of which Nietzsche speaks is that of the superman.
Nietzsche's superman is not constrained or limited by conventional morality, nor is he distracted by superearthly or 'metaphysical' claims. He represents the ultimate human being and the highest human attainment. The superman represents man and his transcendence of his himself; in going beyond himself he has the strength to completely accept the past with it's perceived (and actual) failures and to truly will it's eternal return. For Nietzsche the superman is able to will the eternal recurrence because it validates forever all that he has become and should be; nothing greater can he do except to will the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche's concept of the superman then is a helpful illustration of his aphorism; If an individual has the character of the superman he also has a standard experience in every instance of the context he finds himself.
The title of this essay asserts that Nietzsche believes decision ought always be made on the thought experiment of eternal recurrence, but would Nietzsche support this claim? Based on my examination I would agree that he does. For Nietzsche to strive for predominance, and fully actualise my potential and possibility, I should make each decision in such a way that no greater thing can be done.
To illustrate Nietzsche's point I will consider an example. If I was to choose post graduate education I would observe that my aim would be to achieve the best grades, to learn and develop my understanding and ultimately attain the qualification to which my study was orientated. In Nietzsche's view of the will to power I might also have the unconscious (or perhaps conscious but not admitted) desire to become an authority or significant figure in whichever field I might study. What I wouldn't find would be that my aim would be an overwhelming desire to fail or not to succeed in my venture. Nietzsche's will to power makes sense in this context; human beings strive to grow and flourish not to fail.
Taken further, how would my venture in education be affected when confronted with the possibility of eternal recurrence? It is very likely that, in accordance with the will to power, I would strive to discharge the sum of my potential and possibility in every aspect. If confronted with the possibility of living every moment again I would carefully consider each action taken and reflexivity would characterise my decision making process. For fear of missing an opportunity to increase in learning, or to achieve a better grade, there would be no room for apathy or complacency when faced with a decision.
Such a position is not without merit, adopting the view that each decision should carry such weight, might push an individual to achieve a greatness that he might otherwise not attain. The severity and seriousness of such a thought experiment suggests something of the value that Nietzsche places on making considered decisions and the consequence of making poor decisions. That considered such a view is then not without difficulty. The responsibility of making good choices may paralyse me and prevent or delay urgent action when the answer is not clear to me. It is also not always clear that the decision I make is the right or best decision often until after it has been made. I may strive for predominance and order my existence as though faced with the eternal recurrence, yet the outcome may not be desirable.
Monday, 12 October 2015
Nietzsche: Antithesis cannot produce thesis
In this essay I will examine the assertion “Antithesis cannot produce thesis”. To better understand what Nietzsche is proposing, and to understand his position as an 'anti-philosopher', I will look to contrast his viewpoint with the Philosophy he is rejecting. Socrates, claiming ignorance, was driven by the search for an adequate answer to questions such as “what is Justice?” and “What is courage?”. He began from the position of ignorance -which is of significance in itself insofar as to have made his own assertion might have left him vulnerable to his own method- and encouraged his opponent to make an assertion with the question “What is x” where x represents the topic of choice. The Opponent would then respond with “x is y” where y represents the opponents assertion of what x is.
Socrates would then secure the agreement of his counterpart to a series of assertions until it became clear that his opponents original assertion “x is y” is found to be false. We can understand this dialogue as a simple method employed to eliminate false statements. The process involves the assertion of a thesis such as “Being happy is good” and a response to this in the form of it’s opposite -the anti-thesis- in this instance we might propose “Being happy is not good”. The goal is to resolve the conflict between the two assertions thereby identifying one statement as false and its negation as true. This is the dialectic in it's earliest form (prior to Hegelian Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis refinement).
Having identified Socrates’s method we should now examine what he intends to find, namely truth. This is no small task as Truth remains a widely debated subject in philosophy and has been the source of considerable speculation for thousands of years. Despite this challenge, we may observe that by his choice of method it would appear that Socrates understands truth to be some thing in the world that can be found by means of inquiry. Truth for Socrates is a definite thing (true or not), and part of the world in which we live. Not all thinkers have adopted this stance with respect to the nature of truth, and Nietzsche is one such opponent of this position who’s objection I will attempt to exemplify.
If I consider what I have done when I resolve (in my opinion) the conflict between two assertions thesis and anti-thesis; asserting that x is false and therefore that y is true, I can see I have made a decision. It does not necessarily follow that what I have decided is true or false at all just because I claim that it is. Instead my decision describes how I perceive the situation; that x is false and y is true. The point Nietzsche highlights for us at this point, is that we assume that what we have found is truth or conversely untruth.
Nietzsche examines how “meta-physicians” such as Socrates attempt to decide if a statement is true or false. He has observed that for such philosophers there is a commonly held assumption that all statements of truth must have an origin of their own, because they are so distinct from the world in which we live. He proposes that metaphysical inquiry can be recognized by it’s approach to discerning what is true and what is not; that is it can be identified by its use of dialectic.
Returning to the original text Nietzsche makes the exclamation “how could anything originate out of it’s opposite?”. He is acknowledging that both the source and origin of any truth statement at which the philosopher arrives, by means of a dialectic, is flawed. Nietzsche notes that in attempting to develop a dialectic of value, the philosopher assumes that the value he or others confer to a statement is correct. Nietzsche calls into question the existence of antithesis which may simply be how we perceive false statements through the lenses of our prejudice.
To conclude, Any judgement for Nietzsche becomes worthwhile at the point it promotes life. Nietzsche thereby places himself beyond good and evil; and beyond all conventional truth statements. If Nietzsche is correct, and a statement of truth holds no intrinsic value, and should only be considered on the basis of how it affirms life, it would be very difficult to ascertain how I could ever conclude the product of my dialectical inquiry was a thesis.
In this way Nietzsche denies that antithesis can produce thesis. I will be lead precisely where I already intend to go; if I begin believing a statement is false my conclusion will affirm my belief. Consequently the assertion that some statement is true (or false) is more likely to offer a clearer indication of where my prejudices lie than indicate if something is actually true or not. Some may argue that such concerns do not necessarily cast doubt on the existence of truth (which may or may not exist) but rather on my ability to access it by means of rational inquiry. However such a point would render the search for truth moot if we accept as Nietzsche does that man is sole means by which things are valuated and we reject 'superearthly' claims.
Socrates would then secure the agreement of his counterpart to a series of assertions until it became clear that his opponents original assertion “x is y” is found to be false. We can understand this dialogue as a simple method employed to eliminate false statements. The process involves the assertion of a thesis such as “Being happy is good” and a response to this in the form of it’s opposite -the anti-thesis- in this instance we might propose “Being happy is not good”. The goal is to resolve the conflict between the two assertions thereby identifying one statement as false and its negation as true. This is the dialectic in it's earliest form (prior to Hegelian Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis refinement).
Having identified Socrates’s method we should now examine what he intends to find, namely truth. This is no small task as Truth remains a widely debated subject in philosophy and has been the source of considerable speculation for thousands of years. Despite this challenge, we may observe that by his choice of method it would appear that Socrates understands truth to be some thing in the world that can be found by means of inquiry. Truth for Socrates is a definite thing (true or not), and part of the world in which we live. Not all thinkers have adopted this stance with respect to the nature of truth, and Nietzsche is one such opponent of this position who’s objection I will attempt to exemplify.
If I consider what I have done when I resolve (in my opinion) the conflict between two assertions thesis and anti-thesis; asserting that x is false and therefore that y is true, I can see I have made a decision. It does not necessarily follow that what I have decided is true or false at all just because I claim that it is. Instead my decision describes how I perceive the situation; that x is false and y is true. The point Nietzsche highlights for us at this point, is that we assume that what we have found is truth or conversely untruth.
“If everyone saw the world through green glasses, they would be forced to judge that everything they saw was green, and could never be sure whether their eyes saw things as they really are, or did not add something of their own to what they saw. And so it is with our intellect. We can never be certain that what we call Truth is really Truth, or whether it does not merely appear so to us.” (Kleist, 1982).Nietzsche's point in eroding truth is not to promote a kind of nihilism, but to encourage us re-evaluate our understanding of the world. The question to be asked should not be "Is this true?" or "Is this false?" but instead "Is this life-affirming or species furthering?" and "Does this promote life?". Nietzsche thereby 'transcends' (places himself beyond) good and evil and relates to the world in another way.
Nietzsche examines how “meta-physicians” such as Socrates attempt to decide if a statement is true or false. He has observed that for such philosophers there is a commonly held assumption that all statements of truth must have an origin of their own, because they are so distinct from the world in which we live. He proposes that metaphysical inquiry can be recognized by it’s approach to discerning what is true and what is not; that is it can be identified by its use of dialectic.
Returning to the original text Nietzsche makes the exclamation “how could anything originate out of it’s opposite?”. He is acknowledging that both the source and origin of any truth statement at which the philosopher arrives, by means of a dialectic, is flawed. Nietzsche notes that in attempting to develop a dialectic of value, the philosopher assumes that the value he or others confer to a statement is correct. Nietzsche calls into question the existence of antithesis which may simply be how we perceive false statements through the lenses of our prejudice.
To conclude, Any judgement for Nietzsche becomes worthwhile at the point it promotes life. Nietzsche thereby places himself beyond good and evil; and beyond all conventional truth statements. If Nietzsche is correct, and a statement of truth holds no intrinsic value, and should only be considered on the basis of how it affirms life, it would be very difficult to ascertain how I could ever conclude the product of my dialectical inquiry was a thesis.
In this way Nietzsche denies that antithesis can produce thesis. I will be lead precisely where I already intend to go; if I begin believing a statement is false my conclusion will affirm my belief. Consequently the assertion that some statement is true (or false) is more likely to offer a clearer indication of where my prejudices lie than indicate if something is actually true or not. Some may argue that such concerns do not necessarily cast doubt on the existence of truth (which may or may not exist) but rather on my ability to access it by means of rational inquiry. However such a point would render the search for truth moot if we accept as Nietzsche does that man is sole means by which things are valuated and we reject 'superearthly' claims.
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