The Pre-Socratics :: Heraclitus :: Logos

"Though this Word is true evermore, yet men are as unable to understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in accordance with this Word, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each thing according to its kind and showing how it is what it is. But other men know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what they do in sleep." - DKB1

Heraclitus suggests that most Humans beings walk through life perceiving the world but not understanding it; It is as though they are sleepwalking. Others, like Heraclitus, seek to offer an account for how and what things are; they divide up the world accordingly. Yet such men fail to recognise that all things come to pass in accordance with an underlying structure of which they lack experience. This structure is what Heraclitus refers to as the 'Logos'.

'Logos', an apparently challenging term to translate, literally means 'I say', but sometimes is interpreted to mean 'account' or 'Word'. It is the root word from which we derive 'ology' in words such as theology, pharmacology or biology. Heraclitus then, unlike other Pre-Socratics, appears to concern himself with how we think about the way we think about the world.

This is of practical significance given that sensory information is important, but inadequate if we do not have the right language or framework through which to interpret this information. To consider for a moment a hard disk; data must be stored and retrieved by convention otherwise it is nothing more than an arbitrary string of bits.

Contrary to what Plato and Aristotle thought, Heraclitus does not deny the law of non contradiction. He would in fact advocate that apparent contradictions are not what they appear. Given all thing come to pass in accordance with structure, how we resolve apparent contradictions can teach us something. His means of exposing this message or 'Logos' in the world around us is by forcing us to 'do the work' to discover it.

One explanation then of Heraclitus is that his goal is to imitate the complexity of the real world by presenting the reader with a series of puzzles, paradoxes, and other literary devices intentionally to aid in the discovery of the 'Logos'. His statements are not meant literally, but instead are meant to offer the opportunity to discover something about the world.

One such conclusion then might be that we can arrive at general principles and ideas because there is an underlying structure in the world. The world is reasonable [in the cognitive sense]. Heraclitus views his task as that of a tutor not providing insights but offering individuals the means of discovering the answers for themselves. In so doing Heraclitus intends that the individual will, by virtue of reason, truly understand the world around them.

Beyond Good and Evil :: Illuminating What is Noble? (Part 1)

Given how dense this chapter is dense in ideas it seems prudent to tl;dr it into more manageable thematic chunks.

Nietzsches general point throughout this chapter is that life itself is an appropriation and injury to others such that a conscientious objection negates life. To believe the Utopic dream that a different life is possible is to belief in a life that has no organic functions. For my existence to continue I must appropriate and subjugate other forms of life. This has implications in terms of the interactions we have with others.

For example that which is great in man has arisen from an inherent inequality and gradation in rank. That some individuals are meant to be scaffolding to elevate other truly great men. Without such scaffolding there would be no Shakespeare, no Einstein no Dostoyevsky. For those that accept this, however, there exists a risk that great men may fall prey to a corruption of the instincts and sacrifice their elevation on the alter of moral sentiments.

Nietzsche also introduces the idea of master morality and slave morality. The former creates values and embraces suffering; affirming what he recognises of himself in others. The latter rejects the suffering of his condition and accepts a value base that eases the burden of living in unfavourable conditions. An individual, society and culture may consist of variations of master and slave morality. Yet latterly with the rise of democracy we have seen a mixing of blood between the higher and lower races and classes.

Nietzsche asserts that one cannot erase his ancestors from himself with education [although he can deceive himself and others to this effect]. He carrys the values and Morals that have been handed down for generations. With the mixing of races and class so the master needs to think good of himself and consequently corrupts his instincts. This is the rise and fall of many nations throughout history.

Ignobleness then has arisen because man needs to cooperate to survive. That it may be more favourable to the fertility and proliferation of life, where comfortable and favourable conditions are found. As such those races willing to work towards happiness and comfort tend to proliferate. Yet Nietzsche asserts such conditions are not conducive to the establishment of anything more than a weak and mediocre race. For Nietzsche a species are made strong by suffering and learning to survive the intolerable conditions of life.

Beyond Good and Evil :: What is Noble?

[257] Every elevation of man until now has been the product of an aristocratic society - one that believes in a scale of rank, distinctions of worth, and necessitating slavory. Without the pathos of distance [the ruling castes observation of subordinate instruments] the longing for something greater might never have emerged. One should not be under humanitarian illusions as to the origins of such a society. Barbaric men threw themselves upon other weaker men or societies where the flicker of life was almost gone. The noble caste was from the start those barbic yet more complete men.

[258] Corruption, the threat of anarchy breaking out among the instincts, is something distinct from the organisation in which it manifests. When at the beginning of the French revolution aristocracy threw away their privilege in tribute to their moral sentiment, it was the last act of corruption that had existed for centuries. Step by step the aristocracy lowered itself to a function of royalty. It is a mistake for aristocracy to lower itself to a function of kingship or commonwealth, when it is the significance thereof. Its fundamental belief being that society is not permitted to exist for its own sake, but as scaffolding for the elevation of some to a higher existence.

[259] The mutual agreement to refrain from injury seems sensible at first, but is fundamentally a denial of the will to life. Life itself essentially is appropriation, injury, conquest of the weak,suppression and exploitation. But why use such disparaging terms to describe the situation? Even organisation purporting to help individuals, treating others equally, must do likewise if they are to remain healthy. Because life is precisely will to power. The Utopic idea that a form of life is possible that will do otherwise, is to suggest a form of life is possible that will refrain from organic functions. Exploitation is not the hallmark of the depraved but belongs to the nature of the living. As a theory such an idea is novel as a reality it is the fundamental fact of history.

[260] In his examination of morality Nietzsche has identified two distinct types namely master and slave. In some civilisations there is also often a mixture of the two. The origin of master-morality is either the pleasurable realisation by the ruling caste, that they are distinct, or in the dependency of the slave class. For the masters the conception of good / bad are practically equivalent to noble / despicable. Moral value judgements historically were first applied to men [we truthful you liars] and later derivatively applied to actions. The noble man knows it is only he that determines such values, he is a creator of values, honouring what he recognises in himself. He subjects himself to a harsh severity and yet precisely because of this he knows how to honour what he sees in himself. One only has responsibility towards one's equals and consequencently may treat others as they see fit.

Nietzsche explains with slave-morality the situation is distinct. The slave in his subjugation abhors the human condition, and all that the ruling class consider noble. He has a refined distrust for all the ruling class indicate is desirable, and signals such things are not genuinely satisfying. Instead that which alleviates suffering; sympathy, mercy, and humility are the only means of lessening the burden of existence. Essentially it is a morality of utility, the seat of  good and evil. Finally it also includes the desire for freedom; the instinct for happiness and a refined sense of liberty.

[261] Nietzsche explains that vanity is a difficult thing for the noble mind to grasp. Where an accusation of vanity arrives, from one that maintains the master is vain, for the pure noble it seems in bad taste. He may overestimate his value, or rejoice in the joy of others in him, strengthening his own good opinion of himself, yet this is not vanity. It is the right of master to create values; yet as the races and classes mix so the need for the master to think "well of himself" increases. The real risk of vanity for the master is then how much of the slave is in his blood, that he might be seduced by slave morality and the need to think good of himself.

[262] Nietzsche asserts that a species is established and made strong by means of enduring unfavourable conditions. He also asserts that it is known an abundance of nourishment and care produces fertile and exceptional individuals of great variety. Considering aristocratic societies for a moment; in such contexts men are reliant upon their own resources or face extermination. Despite the lack of variation it's experiences teach it exactly what man needs to survive. Intolerance then is virtuous for the aristocrat in as far as he struggles with uniform unfavourable conditions [which are themselves intolerant of him] to the end of an established stable type. There is risk however that peace and luxury relax this discipline and he degenerates. At such a point other saplings rise up towards the light seeking to overtake him. This is the dangerous pinnacle at which man becomes reliant on his ability to live beyond the old morality; reliant upon his self-preservation, elevation and deliverance. He is at risk of becoming the mediocre man; one that preaches moderation and brotherly love.

[263] Nietzsche asserts that within humans there is an instinct for rank which is evidence itself of something higher. There is a delight in the nuance of reverence which suggests there are those of noble origin. This is no more evident than in the demonstrable change in behaviour exhibited by  those lofty souls that experience something of higher rank whilst unprepared. In the same way that which is vulgar is demonstrated to be so whilst in proximity to that which is sacred. It is a matter of instinct. It takes thousands of years to unriddle such things; they cannot touch everything, some things are holy. Those of so called progressive ideas do not keep hands clean, touching everything they should not. It is possible there is more relative nobility of taste among the lower classes, than among the cultured class.

[264] Nietzsche asserts the actions of his ancestors cannot be erased from him. It is quite impossible for an individual not to maintain the qualities and preferences of his parents and ancestors. This Nietzsche asserts is the problem of race. That any involuntarily act, any jealousy or vanity passes to the child as surely as bad blood from parents. Education and culture will only succeed in deceiving others with regard to heredity; it conceals our origins.

[265] Egoism, that fundamental belief that other beings naturally exist in subjection, belongs to the essence of a noble soul. He accepts this without self criticism acknowledging that is is part of the Natural order of things and justice. He recognises there are others also privileged and, first settling the issue of rank, treats others with the same modesty and respect he affords himself by some instinctual mechanism. This is an extension or addition to his egoism; he honours himself in them, and the rights he concedes to them. This exchange of rights  and honours is the essence of all intercourse. He is conscious of the heights he currently occupys.

[256] Nietzsche asserts one can only truly esteem one who does not look out for himself. Perhaps because what is Noble is not esteemed by the lesser classes.

[257] Nietzsche invokes the Chinese proverb "make your heart small". He explains the Greeks would object to this self-dwarfing or negation of the self common in the European man of today.

[258] Nietzsche enquires as to the definition of ignobleness. He begins with a description of words as vocal symbols for ideas. Ideas in turn for Nietzsche are recurrent experiences for collections of sensations. As such it is insufficient to share words there must be some common ground [common experiences]. As such those that spawn from the same point have a unique understanding of each other,thus birthing a nation that understands each other. For Nietzsche a history of recurrent experiences that are more common, and less common, form the basis of mutual understanding. This need to understand one another quickly is proportional to the level of danger; consensus about what is necessary is required quickly in dangerous circumstances. Nothing continues where it is established those using the same langue maintain very different opinions. Whichever group of sensations wake first to command determines that individuals value structure, betraying something of the structure of his soul. Supposing by necessity that nature draws individuals together as (a) have such common experiences, and (b) therefore have a common basis from which to communicate need. Therefore the more similar, the more average the more in common with others. Being refined, then presents a risk of "accident". Individuals are required then, to appeal to great opposing forces to overcome this natural process; the evolution of man to the average, the similar the ignoble.

[269] Nietzsche asserts that the Psychologist is at risk of being suffocated by sympathy. He needs sterness and cheerfulness more than any other man. Given the ruination of higher men is the rule and not the exception. What a challenge to be consistently confronted by the rule. This psychologist is to face the repeated torment of the inner desperateness of higher men. He is at risk of ruination himself. Within every psychologist lives the desire to converse with well ordered men, that reveals a need to flee what his "business" has laid upon his conscience. He is easily swayed by the opinion of others where they have experienced he has only perceived. Perhaps the paradox of his situation has overtaken him his great sympathy and great contempt. The herd have learned great reverence for great men: they worship a "God" and yet he was only a poor sacrificed animal. Success is the greatest liar; the discover is concealed in their discovery, reputed to have created it. But these great men are nothing more than poor little fictions, an afterthought, the false currency of historical values

Those great poets now appear to us as men for a time past. Childish and usually with some concealed defect to be discovered. Pretending to be stars whilst struggling with disbelief in themselves and robbing faith and praise from the mouths of their proponents. What a torment these men are to themselves and others yet having learned sympathy from women [who are deceived in the belief that love can do everything] love conquers all. Yet anyone that knows the heart cannot but see how helpless and blundering love truly is. The life of jesus is one such example; one who could demanded nothing but love and offered outbursts against those who refused. Insatiated and insatiable and so enlightened about man's love that he create a hell for those who would not love him and a god that is the capacity for love. He who knows this about love looks for death! But why deal with such things of you are not obliged to do so.

[270] Nietzsche asserts that a person is utterly coloured by the depth of suffering he has experienced. His encounters with worlds you can never know sets him above the wise and shrewd; "You know nothing" echos the proud words of the almost sacrificed. He protects himself from all sympathy. Profound suffering makes Noble: it sets appart, it separates. One of the most refined versions of such pride is sensualism. It gives the appearance of superficiality a mask. Yet it would be follish to not recognise that under this mask such individuals are truly broken. Irreverence for the mask is the hallmark of an over assured knowledge.

[271] Nietzsche asserts that what separates men is their sense of purity; The spiritualisation of the instinct. The pity of the Saint is pitty for the filth of the human. There are grades and ranks to which pitty is regarded as filth by him.

[272] Nietzsche asserts that a sure sign of nobility is the unwillingness to renounce or share responsibility or duties. That we might lower our duties to the point others might be able to undertaken them.

[273] Nietzsche explains that a man aiming for great things will likely treat others as a means to attain that goal, a delay, or a resting place. His bounty is only possible when he attains domination. Impatience and consciousness is only comedy. Such a man is acquainted with solitude and what is most poisonous in it.

[274] There are incalculable chance elements at play in the possible emergence of a man in whom the solution remains dormant. It simply does not happen. All around the world there are individuals waiting, unaware that such a wait is in vain. The wake up call comes too late when it is no longer possible to take action, and forevermore was useless. Perhaps in regards to genius the artist without hands is not the exception but the rule. Genius might not be rare but requires the 500 hands in order to tyrannise over the right time.

[275] One who doesn't wish to see what man can become looks below himself and therefore betrays himself.

[276] Unlike the common man, the noble spirit has much more to loose and is less likely to recover from the wounds that are inflicted by the diverse  dangers he faces.

[277] The melancholic element of man's existence is that all too late he realises he should have known something important from the very beginning.

[278] Nietzsche indicates the allurement of sympathy and the resting place to the weary noble. For such individuals the only solution is a second mask.

[279] Nietzsche advocates that happiness is fleeting and that men of profound sadness know it will flee all too quickly.

[280] Moral judgments might cause man to take a step backwards but only that he might leap further and far beyond.

[281] For the Noble spirit it is sufficient to insist that others believe in the self knowledge  discovered within me. Whilst the belief in the validity of such self knowledge might be a sort of repugnance it is nonetheless sufficient to me and perhaps betrays the species to which I belong.

[282] Nietzsche asserts for all who aspire to the noble path there are times in which we must face the danger of taking sustinece from those whom we feel idignent, or find it unpalatable to share a meal with. This is the Natural order of things and the cause of after dinner naseau.

[283] It is a skill only to praise where one does not agree; an excellent opportunity for misunderstanding. "He praises me therefore he asserts I am right." is an foolish line of thought that brings asses into friendships.

[284] Nietzsche asserts that to live in accordance with ones choices, to lower oneself to sit upon such asses, one must know how to use such asses stupidity as well as their fire. To do so one must not reveal himself and remain master of his "virtues" most of all solitude as a sublime bias to purity, given all societal contact makes one "commonplace".

[285] Nietzsche asserts that the greatest thoughts are events not experienced by ones contemporarys, who live past it. Nietzsche enquires "How many centuries does a mind require to be understood?".

[286] Whilst the herd accept the free prospect of the mind exalted, the noble spirit has a free prospect but looks down.

[287] Nietzsche enquires what is Noble? Noting that both works and actions might deceive, and may instead betray a longing for nobleness rather than nobleness itself. It is rather the clear indication of a lack of nobleness. Nobleness is a fundamental certainty a noble soul has about itself, which cannot be lost nor found. Such a soul has reverence for itself.

[288] Nietzsche notes that there are some who conceal their intellect yet this always is revealed at the end. Such a thing is desirable these days  and to conceal it is to show enthusiasm; after all enthusiasm is virtue.

[289] There is something of wildness and solitude in the words of the recluse. He who sits alone with his soul over time will discover a goldmine of ideas distinctly coloured like fungus. Something repulsive for the eyes of every passer by. The recluse does not believe philosophers have ever expressed themselves clearly in books. There is something suspicious and arbitrary to him that a philosopher once stood here, looked around, laid his spade down and dug no further. Every opinion is a lurking place, every word a mask.

[290] Every deep thinker is more concerned about being understood than misunderstood. Whilst the latter offends his vanity the former indicates he is not truly great.

[291] Man is a complex entity and has created good conscience to enjoy the soul as something simple. Morality is the falsification by which the soul becomes palatable.

[292] The true philosopher exists as one who experiences the universe as though he were the first ever to do so. Struck be his own thoughts as though they were unique to him. Pregnant with potential. One who is afraid of himself but whose curiosity always brings him back to self examination.

[293] Nietzsche asserts that throughout Europe there is an irrational movement against the existence of pain, that seeks to make itself something superior. Recognisable by its unmanlyness against which one must wear the gay science.

[294] Nietzsche notes that the English sought to bring laughter into disrepute as a character fault. Yet he would rank philosophers in order of their laughter up to those capable of golden laughter. Supposing that God's philosophise and are capable of laughter. This will be at the expense of all serious things and in a superhuman way. God's are fond of ridicule: they cannot refrain from laughter even in holy matters.

[295] The tempter-God is well equipped to capture the conscience and command ever closer obedience. From whose encounter one leaves richer and newer than before. This is noneother than the God Dionysius one of whom Nietzsche asserts he is the last disciple offering a taste of this philosophy in hushed tones. Perhaps Nietzsche is too late, given man's tendency is now to reject God and God's. Traditionally one would extol the God with attributes and awards of merit but Dionysius demans I keep my pomp and gestures. He once said that he loved man and sought out ways to make him stronger more evil and more profound to achieve a greater beauty. To be more human.

[296] Nietzsche comments on the ways in which we grasp flavoursome ideas like birds and immortalise them on paper. Yet they are only for a time and none may grasp how they once truly appeared in the moment they were relevant truth to us.

Beyond Good and Evil :: Illuminating Peoples and Countries

Within this Chapter Nietzsche speaks out against nationalistic sentiment within Europe. He indicates the possible emergence of something greater from the sum of its parts. Given the diversity in expression and the interbreeding of ideas within Europe to arrive at German "profundity" it is not possible to answer with any real conviction "what is German"? Nietzsche here is highlighting the stereotypes and characteristics that can be applied to certain races and then reversing them. Purity of the German spirit, femininity of the Jews [as perceived in the anti-semetic culture of the time] and the intelligence of the British, and so on.

In keeping with this reversal of stereotypes Nietzsche asserts that there are those robust and resilient nations and excellent individuals that bring into being something new. Contrary to anti-senetic belief the Jews do not seek to control Europe but to find a home. A position which could be of significant advantage to Europe were they to absorb this strength rather than seek to repel it. Nietzsche here is drawing a distinction between cultures that fertilise other culture with potential, and those that need to birth within them something new. He speaks of other nations [the English] with some disdain, noting that the moralising and religious heights they presently attain may simple be the extent of their contribution to this new kind of man.

Nietzsche asserts that all of Europe is evidently engaged in this project, a movement from "soil-attachment" and "fatherland" towards a new nation. As such whilst such an endeavour will likely initially produce more gregarious mediocre individuals there will also be fertile ground for men of excellence. Such men will have at their disposal all of Europe to shape in their image. Great thinkers and artists of this age [despite the risk of being nothing more than a reinforcement of national sentiment] already lead us towards this goal. With the close of French romanticism a new age is dawning one in which a stronger man may emerge.

Beyond Good and Evil :: Peoples and Countries

[240] Nietzsche offers criticism of Richard Wagner noting that his overture to the master singer is symptomatic of what is wrong with the German people. That it represents the refinement of moral decadence and consequencently the problem that the German people are stuck in the day before yesterday and as such have no today.

[241] Nietzsche highlights the dangers of the allure of patriotism and nationalism that occupy a considerable portion of the day. Nietzsche asserts that soon a stronger man will emerge and become master of the strong and the compensation for making a nation superfluous is the emergence of a new nation.

[242] Behind the great moral and political foreground of the democratic movement can be found a physiological process of the evolution of the European. Whilst this might be retarded by national sentiment or "soil-attachment" it will give rise to the leveled mediocre man. An industrious, clever and gregarious man. Such ground however is fertile ground for a few exceptional men of the most dangerous quality. Whilst the capacity for adaptation makes the powerfulness of the type impossible Europeans will likely remain numerous, talkative workmen in need of a master. Whilst democracy prepares workers for slavery the strong man will become richer and more powerful than he ever has. The democratising of Europe provides a fertile ground for the rearing of tyrants.

[243] Nietzsche notes the sun is moving towards the constellation hercules and hopes that men will do likewise.

[244] Nietzsche explains that it is accepted that German "deepness" is something desirable but perhaps it is not. To pin down what is German is difficult given the manifold expressions that exist; They are beyond definition diverse in blood and custom. The question cannot be settled internally nor externally with appeals to the perceptions of other nations. The German doesn't exist he is becoming "developing" himself an attractive notion among philosophers, exemplified by Hegel and Wagner. This juxtaposition between the good natured and spiteful; the convenient and the honest. 

[245] The "good old time" has past with Mozart and how much sooner will it be with Beethoven? Given the latter was an echo of transition and the former the last echo of a great European tradition? Beethoven represents the twilight of loss and the dawning of a new hope. How different now is event the apprehension of such a sentiment? How strange the sounds of our forbears sound to us. Such sounds were not noble enough not musical enough to be for anything but the entertainment of the herd; Second rate music. Yet our tastes have progressed that even that which was palatible for musicians we move on from, a petty taste. Such music is at risk of losing the voice for the whole of Europe and becoming nothing more than a national affair.

[246] Nietzsche asserts that likewise German literature has lost the nuance and timbre of language. Yet Nietzsche notes that few actually have an ear for such language and to engage in such literary feats would be to squander upon the deaf. These were Nietzsches thoughts as he read two apparent masters in literary achievement.

[247] Nietzsche again criticises German literary style noting it is written for the eyes not the ear, and is left wanting. The preacher is the only orator who appears to truly grasp the weight of his words and syllables. As such the Bible may well be the greatest attainment given its masterpiece in the form of the preacher.

[248] Nietzsche asserts there are two kinds of genius the first that seeks to give rise to a kind of feeling, that tortures and enraptures into realisation. The later which wills to make itself productive, brings about new modes of life. Both seek each other out and both misunderstand each other.

[249] Nietzsche asserts that every nation has its religiousity and calls that its virtue and height. Yet man is not able to perceive this which is his greatest attainment.

[250] Nietzsche asserts that the best and worst elements within a culture are a gift from the Jews. The heights of morality and the fear of infinite demands and all that allures man to life.

[251] Nietzsche asserts that there are cultural fads and dislikes for particular groups and what each contributes to that culture. Nietzsche asserts that there are sufficient Jews in Germany and the popular sentiment might be to prevent more from entering Germany. Yet this the the cry of a feeble race [Germans] in light of one that is far stronger, tougher and purest race able to succeed in the most unfavourable conditions. This arose because of virtues that some might consider now vices and a resolute faith. Yet this faith need not be embarrassed in the light of "modern ideas" it simply requires alteration. A thinker that is concerned for the future will wager upon the Jews. The Jews could have supremacy over Europe but it is certain they are not working to that end given there efforts are focused elsewhere to abolish the "wandering jew". One should advance towards this instinct given it is possible that the genius for money and patience could not be appropriated for command. Thus is the problem as Nietzsche sees it that of the rearing of a new ruling caste for Europe.

[252] the English have never been philosophical race. Their ancestry set them against the philosophical spirit and represent a degradation. What is lacking in the English both the power and depth of intellect; in short philosophy. Christianity remains necessary for such a race for moralising and humanising. This pennative moralising may be the heights to which the English may attain.

[253] There are some truths only recognised by mediocre minds because they are best adapted to them. It is useful for these mediocre English minds to gain accendency in Europe for a time. Given free spirits would not be best placed to find and evaluate basic facts. Free spirits have to be and represent some new values. There is a yawning void between knowledge and such capacity. The creator may need to be ignorant whereas the scientist requires a certain narrowness. Let it not be forgotten that the English brought about a general depreciation in European thought given these modern ideas are undoubtedly English in origin. The noble sentiment of Europe is French in origin and the ignoble is English work and invention.

[254] Nietzsche asserts France remains the seat of refined intellectual culture. Yet he who belongs to it keeps himself concealed and has the ambition to do so sharing the common dislike for the democratic bourgeois, the dislike for intelectual Germanising, and the inability to avoid it. There are however three things that remain uniquely French for which some credit is due. Firstly artistic emotion in relation to form, secondly their ancient moralistic culture, and thirdly the synthesis between North and South that one might enjoy the former when in the later and visa versa.

[255] Nietzsche maintains that should an individual love a particular form of music he will take precautions against the alternatives, because in injuring his taste he injures his health. His belief about it is that it must in someway "free itself" from the trappings of the other. Nietzsche asserts that he can perceive a music towards which people flee the remnants of a dying moral world. A music profound enough to recieve such belated fugitives.

[256] Nietzsche asserts that despite the nationalist craze perpetuated by shortsighted politicians there is an unmistakable desire that Europe becomes one. Great men of this age worked towards this synthesis and the production of the new European man that the idea of a "fatherland" might become a thing of the past. All the great artists of the 1940s anticipate this one great Europe. They undoubtedly sought to begat this new creation using   all that was alluring and at their disposal to aim for some higher refinement of man.

Beyond Good and Evil :: Illuminating Our Virtues

Nietzsche indicates within this Chapter that man carry with him the values of his ancestors. This expressed most clearly where he employs the allegory of the wardrobe of historic apparel. However such virtues have historically always been employed as a means of tyranny; to keep one from ascending over the other. A means to address the issues of inequality and to promote a more egalitarian society. Where natural gradations in rank, class and spirit exist we address the issue by applying a universal moral standard inherited from our forebears. This permits those offended by our success or ascendancy the right to become our greatest critics. It also has the Natural effect of promoting mediocrity within man and dampening that will to excellence.

There is this wonderful other allegory in the chapter within which Nietzsche likens knowledge to nourishment. Yet like nourishment, knowledge doesn't just keep us healthy but much more: we not only grow but we truly flourish. There is this idea however, that among the moralising herd that the appearance of growth is sufficient. There is no need to actually grow in a meaningful way and morality becomes a great tool by which to undermine the efforts of others; to earth those foolish enough to aspire to loft thoughts.

Nietzsche concludes the second half of this chapter with a brutally scathing attack upon women, and the emancipation of women. He highlights that women had historically been perceived as that which needed preservation or the care of men but this emancipation moves her to independence. This is folly in Nietzsche's eyes given this position was lucrative ground conceded unnecessarily. Furthermore he asserts [not me] that women do not aspire to truth and this is what makes them alluring to men. They are deeply superficial in his opinion. Yet these Liberal women whilst they do not aspire to truth do aspire to "feed man" and his family without acknowledging they have no idea what food actually is. Such ideas in Nietzsche's eyes present the risk of a future non-theistic dominant ideology; one that seeks to control and confound man, and simply omits God from its central claims.

Beyond Good and Evil :: Our Virtues

[214] Nietzsche asserts we still have virtues but they do not look like those virtues for which we honoured our ancestors. Our Virtues are those which resonate with our heartfelt desires. For mankind there is apparently no greater task than to seek out our virtues. We wear the heirlooms of our ancestors; specifically their virtue. Yet very soon it will be very different.

[215] Nietzsche uses the analogy of multiple stars lighting up a world with distinctly different colours. He indicates how different moral systems illuminate the world distinctly and how at times our own actions may be illuminated with various different colours.

[216] Nietzsche asserts that love for ones enemy is a lesson we learned; moral attitude is fundamentally opposed to man's tastes. It is the music in our conscience and the dance in our spirit. A tasteful distraction please to to the senses.

[217] Those who attach great significance to being accredited as moral never forgive us should they err in our presence. They become our long term critics even though they call us "friend". There is an element in which people that aspire to virtue will consciously or unconsciously punish those who see their mortal failings.

[218] Nietzsche asserts that psychologists focus their attention on those exceptions to the rule. Those who seek to surpass mediocrity and be distinct from the herd what should be of real interest is what keeps man mediocre.

[219] Moral judgement is a means to preserve equity rather than gradations of rank between individuals; The belief that all individuals can become equal on the basis of adherence to a common moral system.

[220] Given the disinterested man is elevated it raises the question as to what actually interests the ordinary person. If refined tastes are responded to with disinterest should this not also be the case with love or sacrifice? There will be no answer given, of course, as to answer would require one to show an interest.

[221] Honouring someone is not necessarily a question of virtue. It may be a question of usefulness. Any self professed universal system of Morals incentiveses ommision given the seduction of philanthropy.

[222] Where ever sympathy and suffering with fellow man is encourage there exists genuine self-contempt. Man is a conceited ape he suffers but does not feel it justified unless he suffers with his peers.

[223] Nietzsche uses the allegory of history as a wardrobe full of clothes of the past that no longer fit. In this age we proceed to have a carnival and perhaps nothing will last for the future aside from our own laughter.

[224] The ways in which a context decide upon what is valuable [historical sense] has been plunged into chaos because of the mixing of the classes and races. Like no other age we have access to all civilisations and all of the semi-barbarity that has ever existed on earth. Where human history is dismissed as semi-barbarity, this sense is revealed to be ignoble given it implies the sense for everything. Men of distinguished culture then have no palate for the possibility a culture may strike out on its own, be dissatisfied with its status or admire the strange. Yet what is best in the world is not their property and towards these things they are unfavourably disposed. Duplicitously we honour Shakespeare and all the hideous fumes that erupt from him. We are a whole host of virtues but perhaps not very tasteful. Perhaps our greatest virtue is necessarily contrasted with good taste, that very bad taste. Perhaps what is most valuable is what is most difficult; that man will only achieve his greatest bliss when he is in the greatest danger.

[225] Measures of thought that divide up the world in terms of pleasure and pain are naivetes that one cannot help but look upon with sympathy. It is not sympathy for the sick and misfortune herd. Nor sympathy for the slave classes that struggle after power. Our sympathy is greater, one that perceives how man dwarfs himself, how others want to do away with suffering. Suffering for us should increase, it is not a goal, it is an end. This great suffering has brought into being all the elevations of humanity. It is necessary for man to suffer through refinement. There a greater problems in existence than just the issue of pleasure or pain, and it is naivete to belive otherwise.

[226] Nietzsche asserts that within this world we are woven into a tight net of duties within which we cannot disengage ourselves, we are men of duty. Yet more often than not we boast of our imprisonment and complain about our lot. Yet we are men without duty with fools and appearances against us.

[227] Honesty is one of the few virtues we cannot escape. We will labour at it and spend our time perfecting it. Should our honesty find us disagreeable it will desire the path is made easy. As such we should be prepared to resist and remain strong with all of our wickedness. Let us go to the aid of our gods with all our wickedness, but others will simply believe this honesty to be our wickedness. We must be cautious given every virtue inclines to stupidity, every stupidity to virtue; "stupid to the point of sanctity,".

[228] Nietzsche asserts that whilst morality is wearying and has been made tedious by its proponents it is nonetheless useful. It is desirable that few should reflect upon morality and this certainly appears to be the case. The English utilitarians are tireless and plod on without original thought or even consideration of what has come before. There is a desire for the happiness of the herd to be authoritative; that comfort and fashion are the greatest virtue. But the idea of "general welfare" is no remedy and no ideal. It does not acknowledge that what may be fair to one may not be to another. It gives no consideration to the distinction in rank. These are an unassuming and mediocre race of humans.

[229] Nietzsche explains there are some truths that mankind fears letting loose upon the earth because of what kind of monster may emerge as a result. Almost everything of higher culture is based on cruelty. That others might seek to ply it with sentiment to make it bearable isn't necessarily helpful. This beast we sought to lock away became something else: the Romans enjoyed the arena, the Christians the cross,  the Spaniards the bull fight, the French the revolution and so on. This is the aphrodisiac of cruelty. It is not just appealing to observe the suffering of others but also to experience our own; self mutilation in the religious sense. Man is allured and impelled towards cruelty towards himself.  Thus the seekers of knowledge operate saying nay when they wish to affirm; an intention to injure the spirit. Therefore in every drop of knowledge there is a drop of cruelty.

[230] Nietzsche asserts that the spirit wishes to be master internally and externally and to feel itself as master. It is the ruling will with the power to assimilate new ideas into the old, to reject contradiction. Its object is the incorporation of new experiences within the old arrangement.
In growth or the feeling of growth. This same will has a closing of windows, prohibition or denial in defence against much which is knowable. Yet it will only accept what it can digest. Thus there exist the potential for deception. In the connection between the two is the spirits proclivity to deceive other spirits. This cloak is thrown over all that visible cruelty that any well trained intellect might otherwise observe. Frankly there may be a time we are glorified for our cruelty or honesty but for now let us swell our hearts with excessive moralising. Yet this is vanity and the free spirits great task is to stand before himself and assert "you are more". To the question of "why knowledge at all?" we cannot find any better answer.

[231] Learning alters us in the same deep way that nourishment causes us to flourish. Yet within us there is something solid and unteachable to which we can only follow to our fixed conclusions. These footsteps lead to the fate we embody nothing more than "my truths".

[232] Nietzsche asserts that as women begins to reveal herself "as she is" she exposes her shame and superficiality which has been dominated and repressed by the fear of man. She now calls out what is required of man. Does a woman desire enlightenment, can she desire it? If she can find no thing to adorn herself with, then she wishes to make herself feared. Women do not aspire to truth and this is what men find so alluring.

[233] It betrays corrupt instincts when women compare themselves to three historical women that for Nietzsche and his time represent comical figures. Such individuals perhaps accurately reflect the disaster of woman as she is.

[234] Nietzsche uses the allegory of traditional gender roles to indicate the lack of wisdom within woman. That she attempts to feed all without knowledge of what food is. Nietzsche suggests through an entire lack of reason the human race has been held back.

[235] Nietzsche asserts that there are often a handful of words by which an entire society crystallises itself. Nietzsche gives the example of a mother speaking to her son and stating "you never allow that madness that will make you great pleasure".

[236] Nietzsche asserts that women would not accept what Goethe and Dante believe that women draw men aloft. This is what she believes of the masculine.

[237A] Nietzsche asserts that man has treated women as birds; something that has descended from the heavens and requires cooping up to avoid them running away.

[238] A thinker that aspires to equal rights between the sexes is a shallow one at best; shallow in instinct. A man with the depth of spirit would think of women as property predestined for servitude. With the Greeks as culture, power and influence increased so did their strictness towards woman become greater. How logical or desirable this is; let us consider for ourselves.

[239] Nietzsche asserts that as the weaker sex have received greater respect from man so their demands of men have increased. This belongs to the fundamental taste of democracy. They learn more and make greater claims. She is unlearning to fear man but in so doing looses a profound instinct: That women should move forward when the fear inspiring quality in man that which is man within man is no longer present or desired. As such without this woman deteriorates. Wherever the industrial spirit has triumphed over the militaristic or aristocratic spirit she seeks economic and legal independence and retrograde. In France the influence of woman has decreased in proportion to her emancipation. This weakens her instincts. There is a profound stupidity in this movement. To loose the most successful battlegrounds for victory; that woman must be preserved, cared for, protected and indulged.

There are men who would also like to see women lowered in culture. Increasingly with her degredation she is less capable of fulfilling that primary function of bearing robust and strong children. Nietzsche continues to highlight how the perceived cultural cultivation of man has always correlated with a deterioration of his force of will. Nietzsche asserts that which inspires respect in woman and fear is her nature. That which aspires egoism, her naievete. The disenchantment of women is in progress. Nietzsche warns that thus the "modern idea" may master society once more but this time without a God.

Beyond Good and Evil :: Illuminating We Scholars

As science has emerged from philosophy there has been an emergent power struggle between the philosopher, the schollar and the scientist and a confusion of terms. Largely in Nietzsche opinions because of philosophys aspiration to "knowledge" rather than the aspiration to "life" the latter of which he asserts is a philosophy worthy to rule. Furthermore there are many pitfalls as the philosopher seeks to evolve. Namely the interlectual allure of the schollar and scientist, and the challenge in the face of uncertainty to say yes to life and its worth. The scholar and the scientist smack of religion in so far as they fail to promote self-sufficiency and self-rule.

Nietzsche asserts the scientist is nothing more than a costly measuring tool that, like a mirror, reflects the forms around itself yet has no purpose in itself. The schollar conversely is full of petty envy and highlights petty criticisms when faced with heights he cannot conquer. Confident until one greater arrives forcing him into cold submission. Yet Nietzsche asserts what is needed is courage and daring to go further; to stand alone and be held accountable for it. Whilst it may be that such a philosopher emerges from academic or scientific contexts he cannot remain there.

The true Philosophers task is not merely to reflect or know about existing values but to create them. For Nietzsche then this is consistent with the idea that life is more than the acquisition of knowledge like the schollar, or the inauthentic reflection of life around us like the scientist. To truly affirm life requires risking oneself, embodying something, and playing the bad game rather than withdrawing into mediocrity when things are difficult. The true philosopher isn't something to "know" but something to be.

Nietzsche indicates towards the end of this chapter that the emergence of true philosophers is not accidental. He uses the analogy of breeding or perhaps more clearly "inheritance" to indicate how such individuals might emerge. The comment here contextually seems to indicate these are those willing to engage with the great wealth of thought that precedes them. From this position one is equipped to command others. He indicates that whilst the herd may oooh and ahhh at the glory of the true philosopher, such paths are not for those willing to substitute entertainment for genuine engagement with the ideas. That the true philosophers task is to take a knife to the heart of the virtues of his age; to aid man in the discovery of greatness, and embodying what man can become, to move him past values of a former age.

Beyond Good and Evil :: We Scholars

[204] Nietzsche wishes to protest an improper elevation of scientific thought in its relation to philosophy. He advocates that the individuals experience uniquely qualifies him to speak. The alternative is to risk speaking about something he is not qualified to mention. It has become apparent, that within the context of a herd that desires freedom from all masters, the emancipation of science from philosophy has exagerated the self glorifying and conceitedness of the schollar to the point at which he seeks dominion over philosophy.

Behind the contempt for philosophy Nietzsche discovered the scarred battlegrounds of one philosophers attempt after another to rid the world of the other —the result being a general ill-will to all philosophy. Schopenhauers rage against Hegel, being a prime example as he succeeded in severing an entire generation of Germans from its connection with German culture. Nietzsche asserts it may have been humanness, all-too-humanness that injured the reverence for philosophy and opened the doors to the instinct of the populace.

Let it be acknowledged at this point then how the modern world diverges from that of the ancient world. That the positivist or realists seek to instill a profound distrust and disbelief in the great venture of philosophy. In Nietzsches opinion there is some merit in relation to this reinvention of philosophy as subbordinate. Namely that philosophy as reduced to a "theory of knowledge" which is nothing more than the profession of an era, never proceeds beyond the threshold. Such a philosophy denies itself the right to enter the modern era. How could such a philosophy rule?

[205] Nietzsche observes that many dangers face the philosopher that seeks to evolve to attain their elevation. The structure of science has grown enormously and the allure of intellectual refinement presents a risk he will tire of his venture and attach himself as a "specialist" The risk of such a fall is that one no longer leads unless he is an actor, a misleader.

Yet other challenges are present. This includes the decision to say yes or not to life and its worth despite the most extensive hesitation, doubt and bemusement. It is common to be consider "philosophical" if one lives prudently or distinctly. Wisdom then to the herd seems to be a withdrawal successfully from a bad game. Yet Nietzsche suggests distinct from the schollar and scientist the genuine philosopher lives imprudently and unwisely; he risks himself as he plays the bad game.

[206] Nietzsche asserts that which gives rise to both the schollar and the scientist has something of religion about it. He explains that both are neither self-ruling nor self-sufficient. The scientist is industrious and has an instinct for what those about him need. Yet there exists with in the scientist the perpetual need to verify his usefulness and value because of his inward distrust that requires overcoming time and time again. The schollar conversely is full of petty envy and is adept in highlighting criticisms in what heights he cannot attain. He is confident until one greater arrives forcing him into cold submission. The schollars most dangerous fault is the desire for mediocrity. To Labour destructive against the greater man and indulgently relax.

[207] Nietzsche agrees that whilst we may be thankful for objectivity the de-personalising of the spirit has become a celebrated accomplishment like it was always the end game. Realistically the ideal scientist is a costly tool; a mirror with no purpose other than to reflect the forms of other things. His confusion extends to his own needs and tomorrow he has no greater understanding of himself than he did today. He doesn't take himself seriously or devote time to himself and is indifferent to the question of life and its value. He is the worthless remains of his virtue, his Love and hatred are mediocre and inauthentic. He is only genuine in as far as he can be objective. He has no capacity to afirm or deny and is too distant from the world to decide upon good or evil. He is no leader; he is nothing more than a costly measuring instrument. A lump of clay waiting for a form to pass by in whose image he shapes himself. A frame less man and nothing for a woman.

[208] To consider oneself to not be a sceptic is to face mistrust and numerous questions. Indeed among those that are timid, a non-sceptic, such ideas are considered dangerous like a new kind of explosive weapon; one that not only denies but one that means and practices denial. For there is no greater sedative than scepticism. The sceptic is far to easily frightened into beginning by saying no to the question of life and its worth and only contributing a yes when there is the most clear agreement. He perhaps echos Socrates with his assertion that "he knows he knows nothing". Yet Nietzsche enquires is there not time to consider things in turn? Does everything have to become clear at once before one can commit himself? Scepticism is often the outworking of nervousness and those who inherit it from the radical blending of classes are lacking in spirit and most notably will. They are unable to make independent decisions or enjoy the pleasure of willing. Paralysis of the will is rife and often dresses as the "scientific spirit" or "objectiveness". Will awaits in the wings in Russia, waiting to discharge itself uncertain whether to be affirmative or not. For Europe to contend it must unite as a single will and become equally threatening. The time for petty politics is past the next stage is the struggle for dominion over the world; the will to truly great politics.

[209] Nietzsche explains that perhaps another kind of scepticism is necessary for this age. He uses the story of the father of Frederick the great who identified that there was something lacking in man. His Son had lapsed into atheism and he saw the great leech scepticism and suspected his son no longer had the hardness of heart for good or evil or the strength to command. Yet unbeknownst to Fredericks Father there grew in Frederick that new kind of scepticism, one of daring. One that refutes and takes possession giving the spirit a dangerous liberty whilst fiercely guarding the heart. The emergence of this uniquely German spirit established itself as a fearless gaze and a resolve to dangerous voyages of discovery; one that brings a shudder to the most temperate humanitarian.

[210] Nietzsche enquires then if philosophers of the future should bear resemblance to sceptics of this kind. They might rightly call themselves critics. They will dare to go further to acquire knowledge and experiment. They will be less inclined to that which distinguishes the critic from the sceptic namely a preoccupation with certainty of worth and the application of a uniform method. The capacity to stand alone and be responsible for it. A delight in the dissection of ideas and a stomach to match. With no ambition to please or desire for truth. They would not seek to reconcile but instead abhor that which is not born from that critical scepticism from which he is begat. This critical discipline in interlectual thought will be a precious adornment. Yet they will not want to be called critics, given the thought that philosophy is criticism and nothing else is not palatable. They will be clear that critics are instruments of the philosopher and not philosophers themselves.

[211] Nietzsche rejects the notion that scientists are philosophers and philosophers scientists with credit given where none is due and missed when it is owed. It may be necessary that the philosopher come from such a place as the scientist, schollar, theologian and historian that he might traverse the vast range of valuations. His task however is not merely to see values but to create them. Philosophical workers seek to fix former determinations of value that arise from the logical, political and artistic contexts. True philosophers however are law givers and say "thus it shall be" outlining the "what" and the "why" grasping at the future with a creative hand. Knowledge for them is creating [law-giving] and their will to truth is will to power.

[212] Nietzsche asserts that the philosopher, one indispensable to his age, finds himself living contrary to the era in which he lives. He has found himself task with putting a knife to the heart of the values of his age for the sake of a new greatness in man. He is tasked to move the herd on from ideas that were outlived to face the world of "modern ideas" moving himself to become the extent to which man can stretch his responsibilities. Nowadays the virtue of the age weakens and compensates for the will; strength of will must therefore be included within the category of greatness. The opposite being humility, renunciation and selflessness; letting oneself go for the sake of happiness. He who is master of his own virtues will be the greatest and is such greatness possible nowadays?

[213] Nietzsche asserts the challenge of knowing what a philosopher is given it is something to be lived not something to know. Nietzsche asserts that one should have the pride not to know it given it cannot be taught. There is a tendency to speak about what one knows nothing about and for such individuals anything that requires effort is reserved for the noble whilst they receded into entertainment. To "think" and to take a matter "seriously" is considered one and the same act [there is a failure to sincerely engage]. Artists have a finer intuition one that distinguishes between the arbitrary and the necessary. What use is it then for every day intellects to consider such a problem? These dangerous paths are not for one's such as these. True philosophers must be bred for it; many philosophers preparing the way for him in creating, transmitting and embodying virtues. That he might take up his great responsibility characterised by separation from the herd and defense of what is misunderstood be it God or Devil. This is the art of commanding which rarely looks up, admires or loves.

Beyond Good and Evil :: Illuminating the Natural History of Morals

Within this Chapter Nietzsche addresses attempts to reflect upon the origin and nature of morality. He firstly criticises the lack of critical reflection upon the possibility that morality is not a definite thing. That moral decisions are time and decision specific; morality as the flora of context [time and decision specific]. He notes that morality can profess much about the proponent. Specifically the proponents willingness to obey and his belief in the necessity for others to do likewise. Following this line of reasoning Nietzsche concludes that every system of Morals then is a tyranny. The belief that "Thou must obey some one, and for a long time; OTHERWISE thou wilt come to grief, and lose all respect for thyself".

Nietzsche suggests that ultimately the reasons for moral obedience are illusive and that it is unlikely we will truly understand what motivates compliance in humans. We simply observe a large number of people who obey a small number of people that command. Yet to lead means to step outside the moral order of things. It weakens man to make peace with the existence of warring values. Should this conflict instead become a renewed source of life then he has potential to become one that conquers.

Nietzsche offers several critiques of utilitarianism indicating that such an ideal is built upon the faulty premise that we (a) decide what is good, and (b) interpret our behaviour to fit our conception of the good. Yet Nietzsche criticises such thinking as nothing more than suggestions of behaviour modification to avoid self inflicted danger [do X to maximise happiness as though utility was the end most desirable]. In his opinion such suggestions have no greater value than homeopathic recipes or old wives tales. Human behaviour is far too nuanced for such generalisations. The implication that only stupid people do wrong [if they only knew what would make them happy and that in suffering I might gain nothing] and that doing wrong is not desirable.

As long as the moral litmus is group utility Nietzsche concludes there can be no good actions by the individual. An action such as charity can no longer be considered good independently, given the measure is the outcome for the herd not the receiver of charity. How much or how little danger to the community is contained within an opinion or action becomes the new moral standard. To stand alone even with good reason is to threaten the herd. Aspirations of mediocrity then attain the highest honour given they threaten the herd the least. Yet impotent and mediocre man is not the end game. Such a moral ideal is built upon the utopic vision that if we could do away with danger morality would not be necessary.

Nietzsche asserts that man has proven himself to be a herd animal. Precisely what is good and what is evil is nothing more than the instinct of the herd that prevails. An autonomous herd, proposed by socialists, does away with any kind of master slave distinction. The natural conclusion of which is the removal of rights; further still the opposition of rights given such rights are no longer necessary. Where then can man find hope for the species? Nietzsche indicates that what is necessary are original minds strong enough to initiate opposite estimates of value. To teach man the future of humanity as his will, his desire. To train and educate to avoid the foolish repetition of chance that has so far prevailed. Such leaders are necessary and the stark reality is they may never arrive. He who knows the herd and those [socialists] that seek to place the great alongside the weak -and make nothing more of man than a gregarious animal- knows such a frightening reality is possible; and perhaps may be motivated to act to prevent such a calamity.

Beyond Good and Evil :: The Natural History of Morals

[186] According to Nietzsche "Science of Morals" has fallen foul of becoming refined and presumptuous. Philosophers have pursued the mythological philosophers stone; a "basis" or foundation to morality. Little consideration has been given to the possibility that there could be a problem with morality, or more precisely a difficulty with identifying a basis for something which is both context and time specififc. No philosopher hitherto has considered the possibility of types: the collection and classification of sentiments of worth which live, grow, propagate, and perish. The maliable and ever changing face of morality have instead simply been accepted on good faith. Nietzsche asserts that this is no greater exemplified than within schopenhauers philosophy. That despite his proclamation of pessimism and refutation of God and the world he accepts on good faith the basis that "hurt nobody on the contrary help everybody as much as you can" forms the basic principle of morality [simply a restating of the golden rule]. There is an inauthentic irony in such a claim.

[187] Nietzsche enquires what a system of Morals can tell us about the individual proposing it. Some are to justify or glorify the individual or specific actions they take, others to satisfy the individual others to crucify himself and those on whom he is after revenge. Others still seek power, dominion or creative licence over man to make him in his own image. Kant is one such individual whom indicates his own willingness to obey and the necessity for others to do likewise.

[188] Nietzsche asserts every system of Morals then is a tyranny against nature. He acknowledges such an observation is not an objection to tyranny unless this morality finds that all tyranny against nature is unlawful [thereby becoming an ironic tautology]. Nietzsche asserts the freedom enjoyed today by the moralists who profess liberty has only been won by means of such a tyranny. Nietzsche asserts that it is most likely that such a tyranny is natural and that the appearance of letting go is actually adherence to countless laws. That what is necessary is obedience in the same direction to achieve the same results. Progress is therefore nothing more than refinement and avoidance of the arbitrary after all. Nietzsche explains such heights of human achievement are what the moralists propose makes life worth living. This long bondage which the thinker inflicts upon himself to play by the rules is where the European spirit draws its strength: mobility and curiosity (albeit with much spirit suffocated and stifled in the process). Yet such a process exhibits "nature" in all her indifferent glory. Historically European man only thought to prove something [his existence perhaps] whereas now man is suspicious of anyone trying to prove anything. Conclusions are pre-agreed; it is after all for the "glory of God". Such is the narrowing of perspectives brought about by slave morality. Nietzsche concludes that the only moral imperative which he can identify is that "Thou must obey some one, and for a long time; OTHERWISE thou wilt come to grief, and lose all respect for thyself". It is neither categorical nor addressed to the individual. It is instead addressed to the animal "man".

[189] Nietzsche asserts that the   sacred value that man place upon Sundays was a stroke of English genius. Idleness does not come naturally to the industrious and during such a fast of activity one learns humility and submission, whilst at the same time being purified and sharpened. Within this paradox the Christian sentiments for sexual impulses were sublimated to become love.

[190] Nietzsche explains that within popular reasoning lies the view that error occurs through ignorance. Perceiving the unpleasantness of evil and identifying the good as useful they conclude that only the stupid do wrong. Nietzsche indicates that such thinking is typically indicative of utilitarianism; to decide upon the good and to interpret myself into my tenants.

[191] Nietzsche asserts the oldest problem of morality is that of whether faith [instinct] or reason deserves the greater authority. For Socrates it was the latter and he laughed at the incapacity of athenian nobles as he exposed their lack of knowledge. But this was his inauthentic movement given he advocated one should use reason as a tool to support his instincts. As such he deceived his conscience to the point of outwitting himself, falling foul of the utilitarian trap of interpreting himself into his tenants. Descartes on the other hand recognised the authority of reason but only at a very superficial level.

[192] Nietzsche asserts when faced with the possibility of something new man attempts to reconcile it with what he already believes to be the case. Much in the same way we hear a language and attempt to recognise within it familiar words. We see or read something and guess it's intention or meaning rather than clarifying what is actually meant; we recall an individual making an expression in conversation vividly in perhaps a way that they didn't but it appeared to us so. As such we are more accustomed to lying than we realise. Or to put it more politely one is more of an artist than one is aware of.

[193] Nietzsche asserts that what we frequently dream is just as much a part of us as anything we experience in the real world. For one who believes he can make such dreams a reality on the slightest impulse without constraint as he battles uphill and trouble as he decends again. How could he fail? Surely what the poets speak of is simply too much trouble, to violent for him.

[194] The distinction between men is not restricted alone to what they consider to be of value but also what they regard as desirable. With regards to women one man perceives faithfulness as possession, another considers the self denial on behalf of one's husband while a third has his devilry discovered and only considers her possessed when she loves him despite his wickedness. Within each individual man finds an unobjectionable opportunity for a new possession. That which he can shape and mould into his own image.

[195] Nietzsche highlights that it is with the Jews that the inversion of values emerged as they sought to possess and shape man in their image.

[196] Nietzsche uses the allegory of "many dark bodies near the sun we shall never see" an allegory to adequately highlight that the psychological motives behind moral compliance. They are nuanced and opaque.

[197] Nietzsche explains that as long as one perceives a morbidity in the beast and man of prey or even some innate evil within them as all moralists do. Nietzsche highlights that all moralists seek to discredit the biological man in his Infancy as somehow a disease or degeneracy. Is this not just morality as timidity!?

[198] Nietzsche criticises systems of utility as nothing more than suggestion of behaviour modification to avoid self inflicted danger. These in his opinion have no greater value than homeopathic recipes or old wives tales; generalising where no generalisations are possible. It is far from scientific or reasonable.

[199] Nietzsche introduces the concept of the herd; a large number of people who obey a small number of people that command. This desire to obey indicates a yearning within man proportionate to his strength, a formal conscience insistent upon whatever "thou shalt" is whispered into its ear be it by teachers, parents or public opinion. This herd instinct to obedience is transmitted at the cost of command. Bad conscience then is the self deception that permits one to lead without feeling as though one has stepped outside the moral order of things. European man glorifies himself as though he was the only kind of man permissible and this gregarious peculiarly human paragon of virtue seeks to replace those born to command.

[200] Nietzsche explains that the man that accepts contrary and warring standards of value within himself will be weak. His fundamental aim is that the war within himself would cease, with happiness a soothing balm. Should however this conflict become a renewed source of life then he has potential to become one that conquers others. The types are complimentary and spring from the same cause.

[201] Nietzsche asserts that as long as the utility that determines social estimates is one concerned only with herd happiness there can be no moral basis for the love for ones neighbour. Whilst there may be the activity of instincts referred to as "virtues" a sympathetic action is neither good nor bad given it must always be considered in relation to the welfare of the whole herd. Love for one's neighbour then is only a secondary matter manifest in relation to our fear of our neighbour. How much or how little danger to the community is contained within an opinion becomes the new moral standard. The will to stand alone and even cogent reasons for doing so are perceived as threats and henceforth called an evil. The mediocrity of desires attains the highest honour given it threatens the herd the least; "the sheep" wins respect. As such society takes the part of man that hurts it: "the criminal" and punishes it. Yet is it not sufficient that man be rendered impotent, harmless and ineffective? As such this gregarious morality exposes the fact that if one could do away with danger this morality would not be necessary. It is built upon the utopic vision that one day there will be nothing to fear. For the progressive then the name for the will and way towards this vision is called progress.

[202] Nietzsche asserts that whilst it might prove offensive to describe him as such; man has proven himself to be a herd animal. The moral consensus we observe across Europe and within countries of European influence are indicative of just this. What socrates believed he didn't know, and what the serpent promised to teach us: precisely what is good and what is evil. Yet this is nothing more than the instinct of the herd that prevails. Morality within Europe Nietzsche asserts is herding animal morality. This is only one form of morality beyond which a higher morality may emerge. Against such a possibility this morality defends itself with all its fervent strength. "I am morality itself and nothing else is morality!". With the help of religion such a morality has become more prevalent and obvious yet it is too slow for the socialists who seek an autonomous herd and to do away with any kind of  master slave distinction. To do away with any advantage of one over another the natural conclusion of which is the removal of rights; further still the opposition of rights given they are no longer necessary. Such individuals are one in their distrust of punitive justice, in their sympathy for all, in their hatred of suffering, in the practice of mutual sympathy as morality, in their belief of community as deliverer and their belief in themselves.

[203] Nietzsche enquires where those that recognise such a man as a dying species should seek hope? In original minds strong enough to initiate opposite estimates of value. To teach man the future of humanity as his will. To train and educate to avoid the foolish repetition of chance. For this purpose a new kind of philosopher is necessary one whose task all things abhorrent pale in comparison. Nietzsche questions the lawfulness of even mentioning the conditions within which one would arise and feel a constraint to these tasks. One requiring sturdy conscience and heart. Yet such leaders are necessary and the reality is they may never arrive. Yet few pains are as debilitating as having observed man degenerate. He who sees this sees all that man could become. He knows better still the tragedy when the greatest possibilities of man have broken down. He who knows the degeneracy of man as idealised by the socialists that seek to place the great alongside the weak and make nothing more of him than a gregarious animal, knows this is possible; and perhaps also a new mission.

Beyond Good and Evil :: Illuminating the Religious Mood

The third chapter entitled "the religious mood" is one within which Nietzsche offers a fierce attack on the ideology that accompanys religious thought. It focuses on what Nietzsche perceives are the aims of the religious spirit, and the dangers found therein. Nietzsche begins with a description of the religious pathology which he terms the "slow suicide of reason" of its adherents. Arguing that it could be nothing other than self-mutilation to disregard and even negate the fundamental instincts that keep man alive.

In its Infancy religion was concerned with the sacrifice of others [primative stage]. Next it became concerned with the sacrifice of instinct for virtue [moral stage]. Finally it sought to sacrifice its God that it might worship gravity, magnetism and nothingness [modern stage]. This final folly Nietzsche asserts is a wound man still carry the scars of today.

How then is religion alluring? Why then would individuals be taken in by it if it is harmful? Nietzsche suggest this is for three reasons. Firstly man perceives within the Saint a strength of will that mirrors his own [albeit one that is secretly a negation of the will] this causes him to pause and make enquiries. Secondly a life of piety prevents the discovery of truth; man fears nothing more than the discovery of truth before he is strong enough to hear it. Thirdly religion is an effective means by which to find satisfaction in a world within which it is difficult to live.

Nietzsche alludes to religion being a tool of statecraft in much the same way as economics or politics. It is a tool with which to bind the public conscience to oneself, bring about peace, and also to excuse the ugliness of politics. Yet he warns against religion being permitted to become an end in itself. The crux of his objection appears within [62] where he describes man as an animal not yet adjusted to his environment. He asserts that man is weakened by religions grasp on the public conscience. Religion Nietzsche explains seeks to undermine the potential of the species. It does so by preserving what should have perished for the sake of the suffering populous. The "new creation" for Nietzsche is the "sublime abortion" of man and his glorious potential. Nothing more than a pathetic shadow of all that he might otherwise have become.

This chapter also introduces two  interesting concepts of note that feature elsewhere within Nietzsche thought. Namely the idea of the eternal child and "Circulus vitiosus deus". With regard to the former Nietzsche proposes that perhaps what the intellect has exercised itself upon has only been the opportunity for its exercise. A childish game constructed by a childish mind. Nothing more than a child's plaything and pain to an old man. Yet perhaps this old man requires a new plaything or pain in the future. This cycle is the eternal child.

"Circulus vitiosus deus" translated as "the figure of the vicious circle". Is the anonymous free spirit. This figure, having abolished the meaning of actions in his abandonment of delusional morality, demands infinite repetition of events. When confronted with this nameless man one must either reject his actions as absurd, or accept they are unable to offer criteria from which to judge the abhorrent. Either way this figure makes his point and exposes the possibilities and impossibilities of the individuals chosen moral prejudice.

Beyond Good and Evil :: The Religious Mood

[45] With regards to the problem of knowledge Nietzsche warns of the danger in sending scholars to do the work of the individual. This mass of painful experience is for the adept to arrange. Nietzsche asserts this is something which one must approach oneself. The individual cannot rely on others to make such discoveries on one's behalf. As such he advocates for curiosity noting those that choose a defense of a truth receive nothing.

[46] Nietzsche proposes that Christianity today represents not a firm foundation but the slow suicide of reason. Faith is the sacrifice of freedom and pride at the expense of subjection (being subject to the control of another). He likens it to a form of self mutilation or slavery given it is a painful experience. It disregards the context and chronology that drives a free spirit. For this reason Nietzsche asserts modern man has moved beyond the terrible possibility of the God on the cross. As a slave revolts against nobles so his many sufferings in subsections caused him to revolt against noble morality.

[47] Nietzsche pathologies the religious mood with its prescriptions of solitude, fasting and sexual abstinence. Noting that sudden outbursts of sensualism and renunciation of the will is common both to the savage and civilised. Yet the religious mood is unique in its proliferation of absurdities and superstitions. So how is this negation of the will possible? Even in the most recent philosophy is the question mark of the religious crisis. What remains interesting in the religious mood is the appearance of a miracle; the succession of opposite conditions of the soul valued in morally opposed ways. People thought they could get a grip on the idea that the "bad man" became the "Saint". Yet didn't this happen because people believed in opposite moral evaluations and saw, allowed, and interpreted these opposites into the text and the facts? Perhaps the real miracle then is the failure of interpretation.

[48] Nietzsche suggests that unbelief has distinct meanings for Catholic and protestant countries. For the former it was a rebellion against the spirit of the race and the latter a return to such a spirit.

[49] Nietzsche explains his astonishment at the religiosity if the Greeks; noting it is a noble kind if man who stands before life in such a way. Later Nietzsche notes that as the rabble gained prominence fear grew over religion sowing the seeds of Christianity.

[50] Nietzsche notes that with regards to passion for God there are the mean spirited, honest hearted, and persistently irritating. Protestantism tends to fall in with the latter. He notes that there is an flavour of interlectual exultation and feminine tenderness that longs for the unity of the mystical and physical.

[51] Nietzsche asserts that mightiest men honour the Saint as they recognise the true strength of will; By honouring him, they honour something in themselves. Yet Nietzsche notes the saint also arouses suspicion given the unnatural self negation; as such the will to power is what causes man to stop and question him.

[52] Nietzsche asserts the Jewish old testament contains sayings and men like no other. He compares the western "Modern man" to a house trained animal. The taste for the old testament is a standard against which we judge the great and small. Nietzsche suggests that perhaps for some the new testament will appeal (with its odour of genuine, tender, petty spirit). Nietzsche suggests the greatest "sin in the spirit" is the binding of these books together.

[53] Nietzsche offers explanation for the decline of theism and rise of atheism. He notes that God does not hear and even if he did he would not know how to help. Nietzsche highlights that he seems incapable of communicating himself clearly. As such although the religious instinct grows vigorously, Nietzsche explains it rejects theism with profound distrust.

[54] Nietzsche explains that all modern philosophy has made an attack upon the concept of soul under the guise of the subject predicate distinction. Whilst it is anti-christian it is by no means anti-religious. One once believed in the soul as one believed in grammar; "I" is the condition "think" the predicate supposing a subject as cause. To resolve this "think" became the condition and "I" that synthesis made possible by thinking itself. Kant wished to prove that starting from the subject, the subject could not be proved nor the object (apparent existence of the subject). Therefore the soul may not have always been strange to kant.

[55] Nietzsche suggests a hierarchy of religious cruelty. This begins with the sacrifice of others beloved by the people this was the primitive period. Next they were required to sacrifice their stronger instincts their "nature" during the moral period. Finally when all had been sacrificed man sacrificed virtue and his god to worship gravity, magnetism and nothingness. Nietzsche asserts that the paradox of sacrificing God for nothingness was a profound wound man knows only too well.

[56] He who places himself beyond good and evil sees perhaps the other ideal: the ideal of the man full of life and exuberance. Who has learned to compromise and has things in order with what was and is. And enterally wishes to experience it again as it was and is recurrently.

[57] The world becomes more sharply focused; seems larger and more profound as mans insight into this world increases. New enigmas and new elements present themselves as a challenge to his intellect. Yet perhaps that which the intellect has exercised itself upon has only been the opportunity for its exercise. A childish game constructed by a childish mind. Perhaps that which has caused greatest suffering such as "God" and "sin" will seem to us nothing more than a child's plaything and pain to an old man. Yet perhaps this old man requires a new plaything or pain in the future. This is man as eternal child.

[58] Nietzsche suggests that inaction with a clean conscience is a feature of religion; that aristocratic sentiment that work is dishonouring to the body. Yet among these individuals are "free thinkers" that participate in religion where necessary out of duty to family or country but are indifferent: there is no time for religion it is a question of new business or pleasure. Then there are the pious that glean all they can from history without taking a step toward what might constitute piety. They avoid religious individuals and the trouble this brings. Childlike naivety is necessary for the scholar and his belief in his superiority over the religious; beyond before and above which he believes he has developed.

[59] Nietzsche asserts Anyone who has studied the world in depth will have realised men are superficial. It is the instinct to preserve oneself which teaches him to be false. Here and there one finds "pure forms" in the artist and philosopher. That only seek enjoyment in life by falsifying it (has it so disgusted them?) by its image being clarified, refined and deified. The Religious persons are the highest among their rank. Nietzsche suggests that man fears the discovery of truth before he is strong enough to hear it and the "life in God" is its pinicle; the artistic fear of incurable pessimism that causes entire culture to cleave to religion. Perhaps there is no more effective a means of making man beautiful than piety, given that by it he becomes so superficial, so good his appearance no longer offends.

[60] Nietzsche indicates that to love man for the sake of God is a noble misadventure.

[61] Nietzsche asserts the Philosopher employs religion as a means to discipline and educate in much the same way as he employs the political and economic context. Its influence varies according to those placed under its spell and protection. For the strong it is another means by which to overcome authority- a bond between subjects and rulers. With the former surrendering conscience to the latter. Religion is also a means by which the rulers obtain peace and immunity from the uglyness of politics. Through religion some subject ascend to rule by means of marital customs. It offers aspiration and the choicest interlectual tidbits such as solice and silence. Asceticism and puritanism are the means subjects achieve ascendancy. For the rest born to serve and in the service of general utility there is contentedness; there own aspects become endurable to them. Religion is an effective means by which to find satisfaction in a world within which it is difficult to live.

[62] Nietzsche asserts that religion should be utilised like politics and economics as tools of statecraft. When religion becomes an end in itself there is significant danger. Success in man is typically the exception rather than the rule given man is not yet properly adapted to his environment. The higher a type he represent the greater chance of failure; the law of irrationality manifest in man. Yet how can religion respond to a surpluss of failures? It responds by seeking to preserve whatever can be kept alive for the sake of the suffering population. By so doing it preserves that which should have perished, that which weakens man. Once this systemic preservation of the sick and suffering has taken place what next? It offers a revision of values in a self-destructive fashion; reframing higher man as an unconscionable monster. This was the mission of the church to lead man to suspect every autonomous instinct that might otherwise lead him to greatness. Its goal the sublime abortion of man. Such men are not worthy enough nor strong enough to be the artist of man and sculpt him accordingly. Such individuals have produced the laudible and gregarious dwarfen species we see today.

Beyond Good and Evil :: Illuminating the Free Spirit

Nietzsche asserts that mankind has gone to great lengths to avoid thoughtfulness. Knowledge funnelled through our deterministic dialectic offers a comfortable imagined world of definite absolutes, where in actual fact there are really only degree's and gradation. Many are quick to suffer for, and rush to the defense of, such ideals as though truth needed zealous defenders from falsity. Some individuals withdraw that they might dot every "i" and cross every "t" without risk of challenge. The higher man instead will embrace disgust from others; he is attentive to harsh and refined cynicism.  Nietzsche asserts that independence from such truth is uncommon and requires daring; such a route is not for the feint hearted given the possibility of loosing one's way. Two distinct groups become apparent the first that constitute the group and the second the select few. These groups operate from different perspectives and communication is difficult between the two. What nourishes one is poison to the other. 

Nietzsche describes different epochs in history in relation to value judgments. At one time the value of an action is inferred from its consequence [pre-moral], in another the intention behind the act [moral]. Nietzsche suggests that a further movement is needed in which the value is inferred by that which is unintentional [ultra-moral]. Perhaps the sensibilities that suggest otherwise simply deceive us? He suggest it is naivete to believes in immediate moral certainties. Why not deception?  Is it not sufficient to suppose degree's of seemingness? 

Nietzsche enquires that If we were to assume the reality of our desires and passions would this not be sufficient to understand the world? These desires and passions assemble in a mighty unity called life. It is reasonable to suggest this is one thing rather than many; life operating as a single "will". Where the effects of this will are seen in the world we can identify it's power extends to the world. It is reasonable then to suggest then that all action is the product of this will; all action can be traced back to will to power. Nietzsche asserts that all active force is will to power and nothing else. 

Nietzsche highlights that happiness and virtue are no argument and unhappiness and wickedness are just as little counter arguments to an action. Nietzsche explains that something might be true but be the greatest danger. In such situations the wicked might be best placed to achieve success. Perhaps then severity and craft are more useful in the development of strong individuals than the refined gentle learned man; the individual must learn to conserve himself. 

Nietzsche predicts the rise of the post-modernists; individuals that cleave to "truth" but not dogmatically. The "good" will become deeply personal given the idea of common good is an oxymoron; what is common is typically of little value. Nietzsche asserts that such philosophers will be something profoundly natural unlike those that desire the opposite. These are the superficial and the cause of all human misery and failure. They seek the security, safety and comfort in life. Their usual song is "equality of rights" and "sympathy with all sufferers". Nietzsche asserts that suffering is something looked upon by them as something to be done away with. 

For Nietzsche Dangerousness must increase for human refinement and spirit to develop. That man's will to life might increase to become will to power. That everything wicked serves as well for the elevation of the human species as it's opposite. "free spirits" find themselves at the other extreme of all modern ideology, silent so they don't betray what a spirit can free itself from and where it may be driven - beyond good and evil. Grateful for distress because it frees them from rule and prejudice, inquisitive to a fault with teeth and stomach for the most indigestible suggestions. Nietzsche concludes this chapter by asserting that such are free spirits, the new philosophers!

Beyond Good and Evil :: The Free Spirit

[24] Nietzsche expresses awe at the means by which mankind has attempted to retain his ignorance in order to enjoy life. This "will to knowledge" or rather "will to ignorance" seeks to make all things around human beings clear and simple that we might avoid thoughtfulness. Knowledge then seeks to keep us in a simplified and imagined world [because the alternative is far less palatable]. Nietzsche notes that in such a state our language then becomes one of opposites whereas in this indifferent world there are only degree's and gradation. 

[25] Nietzsche urges caution in suffering or martyrdom for such "truth". He notes that it spoils the neutrality of conscience and makes us act irrationally. This is no clear exemplified than when the most insidious elements challenge such "truth" that we rush to defend this as though it were, innocent, helpless [a kind of Stockholm syndrome of sorts given truth's own insidious agenda by our own standards]. This results Nietzsche suggests in an obsession with minutiae; to dot every "i" and cross every "t" that accusers might not mistake us for what we are. Solitude helps also given our right to practice good in any sense goes unchallenged. Nietzsche concludes that sacrifice for the sake of "truth" then exposes the insecurities in us that are given a voice in our accuser. 

[26] Nietzsche assert that some individuals upon recognising that they are the exception to the rule [read "truth"] and withdraw. Others drive forward and embrace the ensuing disgust from others relishing such an opportunity. However if this is not something voluntary, and the individual persistently avoids such confrontation he is willing to give ground to such "truth" and commit himself to the study of the "average man". One whom "truth" describes in the history of philosophy. If he is fortunate he might meet those that expose this in him through their own discourse in public. The higher man must then be attentive to all coarse and fine cynicism. Nietzsche asserts that such a possible outcome may befall even the greatest genius. He encourages one who has fallen into such a state to listen particularly when indignation is not present, because indignation is a self inflicted wound and no one is such a liar as an indignant individual. 

[27] Nietzsche notes the difficulty in communication between those that live at the faster and those at the slower tempo. He explains that the interpretation and refinement of knowledge between such friends offers an amusing playground for misunderstanding and personal entertainment. 

[28] Nietzsche uses tempo as an allegory here to highlight the difficulties to translate "truth" because it is necessary for it to discharge it's content. He asserts that honest interpretations fail to render such ideas. "Truth" then is developed in profuse variety Nietzsche explains, and one thinker after another leaps forward in tempo yet none could have endured life without another. 

[29] Nietzsche asserts that independence from "truth" is uncommon and not for the feint hearted. There is no obligation to make such an endeavour and one who makes such a goal his pursuit is daring. There is considerable risk above the risks life already presents one of which is the possibility of obliviously loosing your way. Nietzsche advises that when the pangs of conscience resound there is no falling back on the sympathy of other humans for such an individual. 

[30] Nietzsche notes that deepest insights will appear as foolishness to those that are not disposed to hear them. He distinguishes between two types of individuals the exoteric [general public] and the esoteric [select few]. These are not so much distinct groups as individuals looking at the world from different perspectives. The former are below looking upward whilst the latter from above looking down. Nietzsche explains the latter operate from the heights at which no tragedy appears tragic. Therefore that which nourishes the latter is poison to the former but the latter might fall and be honoured in the former. For the latter there are dangerous and disturbing books and the former there are books that call the bravest to their own conception of bravery. 

[31] Nietzsche explains that nuance is the best gain of life given the cost of falling upon others with "yes" or "no". Yet that which is unconditional is ridiculed and no more apparently so than among the youthful that will not rest until they have falsified all to vent it's passion upon it. Nietzsche asserts that when finally this passion turns upon itself it revenges itself for it's own blindness [as though this were a voluntary condition], yet later still on understands this was also only youth. 

[32] Nietzsche highlights that for a time the value of an action was inferred from it's consequence. This was likely due to the retrospective power of success or failure that encouraged men to think well or ill of an action on the basis of the outcome. Nietzsche refers to this period as the "PRE-MORAL". He highlights that there was a fundamental shift in thought brought about likely by further refinement to decide the origin decides it's worth. The value of an act lays then in the value of intention and under this the guise of moral praise and blame are bestowed. Nietzsche refers to this period as the "MORAL". He asserts that perhaps a fundamental shift is needed again as we stand on the threshold of the "ULTRA-MORAL" period. Whereby the decisive value of an action is in that which is not intentional. Intention is a sign [or perhaps a symptom] of moral prejudice, something of the realm of astrology / alchemy which must be overcome. This is a task Nietzsche claims for the most refined and wicked conscience of today. 

[33] Nietzsche asserts that the sentiment to sacrifice the self for another should be called to account. Is such a sentiment not perhaps deceptions that please him who hold them to be the case and enjoy such an outcome? 

[34] Nietzsche notes that from whatever viewpoint of philosophy there is error in our supposition that the world we think is most sure and certain. Philosophers that regard space, time, form and movement as deluded would have good reason to become distrustful also of thought. What guarantee do we have that it would not deceive us? Nietzsche highlights the moral naivete in a belief in immediate certainties. Why not deception? He suggest that if distrust is the sign of "bad character" that the Philosopher more than any has a right to "bad character" if anything he is under obligation to distrustfulness. Nietzsche enquires the value of supposing there is an opposition of "true" and "false"? Is it not sufficient to suppose degree's of seemingness? Nietzsche enquires why we should believe the world is not a fiction, and if it is time to cast off such faith. 

[36] Nietzsche posits that if one were to assume the reality of nothing else but our desires and passions would this not be sufficient for understanding the mechanical world? Not as a "representation" but as maintaining the same degree of reality as our emotions. These desires and passions assembly in a mighty unity called life. Nietzsche suggests that it is reasonable to conclude that one type of causality rather than many exist [until we exhaust this possibility]. It is therefore reasonable again to recognise life operating as a single unified "will". If we recognise this will as operating we believe in the causality of the will. Where the effects of the will are recognised in the material world we acknowledge it's power extends to the material world. It is reasonable to conclude then that all mechanical action is the product of this will and that all organic functions could be traced back to will to power. Nietzsche concludes that all active force is therefore will to power and nothing else. 

[38] Nietzsche asserts that, as exemplified in the French revolution, reinterpretation from a distance has ensured noble posterity might misunderstand the whole of the past to make it's portion endurable. 

[39] Nietzsche asserts that nobody except the idealists regard doctrine as true simply because it makes humans happy or virtuous. Happiness and virtue are no argument and unhappiness and wickedness are just as little counter arguments. Nietzsche explains that something might be true but be the greatest danger. Indeed one might succumb by a full knowledge of it. Strength may in fact be measured in such a situation by the extent to which truth is veiled. In such situations the wicked might be best placed to achieve success. Nietzsche notes for the idealists the wicked may very well be happy [and interestingly the moralists tend to ignore this point]! Perhaps severity and craft are more useful conditions for the development of strong individuals or philosophers than the refined gentle learned man. 

[40] Nietzsche asserts that every profound thing avoids clarity and likeness. Nietzsche highlights that there are delicate situations which we desire overwhelmingly to remember differently. Many are able to abuse their own memory to have vengeance in secret; shame is inventive.
There is not only deceit behind a mask but much goodness in fabrication. A human with something costly and fragile would otherwise clumsily stumble through life as a result of the refinement of shame. Nietzsche explains that one with shame takes paths few would ever reach. He regains security in his concealment of mortal danger. The mask of himself Nietzsche asserts shall occupy his place in the hearts and heads of friends. Owing to the false, superficial interpretation of every word he utters and every sign of life he manifests. 

[41] Nietzsche asserts the individual must establish before himself as judge if he is for independence. He must not clear to another human, a homeland, sympathy, science, liberation or virtue he must learn to conserve himself. 

[42] Nietzsche asserts that a new kind of philosopher is beginning to appear one that wishes to remain something of an enigma [given refinement is overrated!] he might dare to call them tempters [or rather it's certainly a temptation to do so]! 

[43] Nietzsche asserts that such individuals will still undoubtedly cleave to "truth" given Philosophy's preoccupation with it, but he asserts they will not be dogmatists. Such individuals will not look for consensus given people have no right to it. Good will be deeply personal given the idea of common good is an oxymoron given what is common is typically of little value. The great things remain for the great and the abysses for the profound. 

[44] Nietzsche asserts that such philosophers will be something profoundly natural a most "free spirit". Nietzsche concedes there are those that desire the opposite and these are the superficial the cause of all human misery and failure. They seek the security, safety and comfort of all life. Their usual song is "equality of rights" and "sympathy with all sufferers". Nietzsche asserts that suffering is something looked upon by them as something to be done away with. 

Yet Nietzsche asserts we have seen how this actually always takes place under the opposite conditions. Dangerousness must increase for human inventive [refinement] and dissembling [spirit] to develop, under extended and oppressive compulsion, that his will to life increased might increase to become will to power. That everything wicked serves as well for the elevation of the human species as it's opposite. We "free spirits" find ourselves at the other extreme of all modern ideology. We are silent as we do not wish to betray what a spirit can free itself from and where it then may be driven - beyond good and evil. 

Nietzsche suggests that having been at home in many realms of the spirit in which preference, prejudice, youth, origin seem to confine us. We are grateful for distress because it frees us of some rule and prejudice, inquisitive to a fault with teeth and stomach for the most indigestible suggestions. The born jealous friends of solitude, our own profoundest midnight and midday solution. Nietzsche concludes this chapter by asserting that such are the free spirits or new philosophers!