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Sunday, 6 October 2019

Fear and Trembling :: Why study this book? :: Context

Fear and trembling is one of those books that you read once, and barely understand. Read it twice, three times and you might deceive yourself into believing you grasped the most significant aspects. Yet with each successive visit you realise you had barely scratched the surface.

During my most recent visit I became acquainted with Fear and trembling as the stage on which Kierkegaard displays the distinctions between two mindsets that exist within western society. The Greco-Roman (GR) mindset that perceives Truth as objective, universal, timeless, critical, rational, detached and disembodied. The Judeo-Christian (JC) mindset that perceives Truth as subjective, local, historic, irrational, committed and embodied (Dreyfus, 2004).

The GR mindset finds it origin within the Heraclitian idea that there is an underlying Logos or structure within the world that can be discovered and understood. That the nature of a thing could be discovered by a process of reasoned argument, because the world follows consistent logical rules. This world view became embedded within western culture [see the enlightenment] and is perhaps most clearly exemplified within the work of G. W. F. Hegel.

Hegel perceived history as the triumphant and unrelenting progression of ideas within the world spirit [geist] towards freedom by means of the dialectic. Hegel asserted that within every thesis can be found ideas that dialectically lead to its own demise and the rise of a new dominant thesis; each step forward an increment in human rationality and freedom towards the end of 'absolute knowing' [Absolute Mind]. As such the highest goal for any individual is to set aside one's personal desires and ambitions and be motivated exclusively by the general interest of all. Yet this communitarian ethic was unpalatable for Kierkegaard who placed great significance on both individuality and individual choice.

The JC mindset, on the other hand, is one in which their is a relationship with Truth. I am in some way bound [or committed] to it. It is time and context specific and cannot be universalised. To exemplify this consider how one corpus of humans values individual autonomy in choosing a mate. For one group there is a significant emphasis on individual freedom in such a decision; any outside influence is no only considered undesirable but actively discouraged. The other believe and accept that others [family] should be involved in the  process and can even make arrangements without that individual's active participation. How one deigns to answer the question "Which is the best method?" is telling.

Agreement or disagreement we feel compelled to not a position but, our position. We have some ownership of this aspect of our being. Our compelling arguments may be based on rational ideas; but if we took a moment for self reflection we would discover those arguments are not what binds us to our decision. They are simply an afterthought; rationalisations to make us feel better about our commitment to the Universal norm in our own corpus of humanity. Our rationalisations expose our commitment to values we maintain to be true.

For Kierkegaard the GR world view does not offer a complete account of how humans exist within the world. Our relationship with truth is not dispassionate, cold and disinterested in matters of value. We are instead driven by irrational passions to bind ourselves to local and historic truths which are as absolute to us in our contexts as they will be absolute wrong to others in years to come. Without such a possibility there would be no passion in this world only quiet compliance. For this reason I choose to study Fear and Trembling

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